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Abstract
Focusing on the current “Strauss fever” in contemporary China, this thesis addresses
two issues: Why Leo Strauss is popular in China, and how Chinese Straussians interpret and
apply Leo Strauss’s thought in the Chinese context. I argue that, Chinese Straussians are
creatively accepting Leo Strauss’s thoughts: Strauss’s revival of the ancient Western political
philosophy reminds Chinese Straussians to turn their eyes toward ancient Chinese thought.
By reemphasizing the value of traditional Chinese wisdom, Chinese Straussians find that
they have gained a perspective from which to reevaluate the justification of modernity and
all relative Enlightenment and postmodern “isms.” According to them, returning to the
Chinese philosophical tradition will liberate China from the dominance of modern and
contemporary Western thought and reestablish the autonomy of Chinese civilization.
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11. Introduction
One of the most striking yet controversial intellectual phenomena in China during
the first decade of the twenty-first century has been the rise in popularity of Leo Strauss,
the Jewish-American political philosopher. Oddly enough, many young Chinese
scholars and students are reading and discussing Strauss’s books, defending and
criticizing Strauss’s opinions, even following Strauss’s teaching to read ancient Western
classics. In short, they have become his spiritual disciples. On the other hand, the
Chinese intellectuals who dislike Strauss, especially Chinese liberals, find themselves in
an awkward situation: They do not accept Strauss, but they must pay adequate attention
to Strauss in order to criticize him and defend themselves. Ignoring Leo Strauss is now
impossible in China. As Strauss advanced many important criticisms on modernity, the
Chinese Straussians feel that they have the responsibility to continue his inquiry in the
Chinese context, while the anti-Straussians feel that they are being forced to face
Strauss’s challenges.
Not only Chinese intellectuals, but also some American political philosophers have
noticed “Strauss fever” in China. Stanley Rosen told the Boston Globe that “A very, very
significant circle of Strauss admirers has sprung up in, of all places, China.”1 Like Rosen,
1 Jeet Heer, “The Philosopher the Late Leo Strauss has Emerged as the Thinker of the Moment in
Washington, but His Ideas Remain Mysterious. Was He an Ardent Opponent of Tyranny, or an Apologist
for the Abuse of Power?” Boston Globe, May 11, 2003. A very interesting thing I must mention here is that
many Chinese Straussians quote Stanley Rosen in order to expose the great influence of Leo Strauss and
Straussians in China. But they replace Rosen’s sentence by “The location admires Leo Strauss most
nowadays is mainland China.” They note that the source of this sentence is Boston Globe, May 11, 2003, but
2other Western Straussians have also been surprised by this special interest. In fact, both
Harvey C. Mansfield and Heinrich Meier asked the same question while lecturing on
Strauss at Chinese universities: Why are you Chinese interested in Leo Strauss?2 It seems
that it is somewhat difficult for Western intellectuals to understand why Strauss, a
philosopher who focused on the Western tradition and said almost nothing about China,
is now becoming an intellectual celebrity in an East Asian country.
Frankly speaking, it is also not easy for us Chinese to answer this question. As
“Strauss fever” is an on-going intellectual phenomenon, its further influences are far
from clear in Chinese intellectual history. Therefore, this paper is just a preliminary
attempt to examine this phenomenon. The article will address two issues: Why Leo
Strauss is popular in China, and how Chinese Straussians interpret and apply Leo
Strauss’s thought in the Chinese context. I will first introduce how Leo Strauss gradually
became popular in China, then focus on the thoughts of two Chinese scholars, Liu
Xiaofeng (劉小楓 ) and Gan Yang (甘陽 ), who first introduced Leo Strauss to Chinese
intellectuals. Finally, I will discuss some political implications of Chinese Straussians.
none of them shows the original link or checks the original text. As can be seen, there is a huge difference
between Rosen’s original sentence and the Chinese paraphrase. Readers can see the Chinese paraphrase in
Zhang Xu (張旭), “Shitelaosi zai zhongguo”施特勞斯在中國 (“Strauss in China: a Review of the Researches
and Debates on Leo Strauss”), Jishou University Journal (Social Science)吉首師範大學學報（社會科學版）, 24
(2003), 13.
2 Wang Tao, “Leo Strauss in China,” Claremont Review of Books, Spring 2012, accessed March 19, 2014.
http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1955/article_detail.asp, and Deng Zhenglai (鄧正來) &
Harvey C. Mansfield, “Yu shitelaosi xuepai xiangguan de ruogan wenti (2008)”與施特勞斯學派相關的若干
問題 (“Questions regarding the Strauss School: a Dialogue with Professor Mansfield, 2008”), Xu Jian ed,
Gujin zhizheng yu wenming zijue古今之爭與文明自覺 (Quarrels between the Ancients and the Moderns and the
Self-consciousness of a Civilization: Leo Strauss in the Chinese Context), Shanghai, Huadong Normal University
Press, 2010, p. 142-43.
3Readers will see that Chinese Straussians are not passive receivers of Western
philosophy. On the contrary, as they have strong concerns about particular Chinese
problems, they are creatively adapting Leo Strauss’s thoughts: Strauss’s revival of the
ancient Western political philosophy and his reinterpretation of classical “great books”
remind Chinese Straussians to turn their eyes toward ancient China. By reemphasizing
the value of traditional Chinese thought, such as Confucianism, Chinese Straussians
have gained a perspective from which to reevaluate the justification of modernity and all
relative Enlightenment and postmodern “isms.” For them, returning to the Chinese
tradition will liberate China from the dominance of modern and contemporary Western
thought and reestablish the autonomy of Chinese civilization. Therefore, it is clear that
the “Strauss fever” is an important philosophical movement. In terms of political
implications, unlike American Straussians, Chinese Straussians do not feel they have a
heavy responsibility to reconcile the relationship between Strauss’s anti-modern political
thought and modern liberal democratic regime. As China is not a liberal democracy,
Chinese liberals are afraid that the Straussians cannot play a positive role in Chinese
liberalization and democratization.
There have already been three English articles on this controversial phenomenon.
Zhou Lian’s article “The Most Fashionable and the Most Relevant”3 was the earliest one
introducing “Strauss fever” to the Western audience. Zhou expressed his worry about
3 Zhou Lian, “The Most Fashionable and the Most Relevant: A Review of Contemporary Chinese Political
Philosophy,” Diogenes, 56 (2009), 128-137. Zhou Lian (周濂) is Professor of Philosophy at Tsinghua
University in Beijing, specializing in political philosophy.
4Chinese Straussians and Schmittians because both of them were critics of liberalism. He
quotes Mark Lilla’s words to warn them that they should “be scrupulous in
distinguishing liberalism’s genuinely philosophical critics from those who practice the
politics of theoretical despair.”4 However, this article only focuses on the political
implications without mentioning anything about Straussians’ philosophical attempt to
revive traditional Chinese thought.
Mark Lilla’s “Reading Strauss in Beijing”5 might be the most well-known article
among Western intellectual circles. He had met several Chinese students interested in
political philosophy during his teaching career and was invited to give some lectures in
China in 2010. Therefore, some of his observations in this article were insightful. He was
also curious about the political implications of Chinese Straussians, and believed that
they were interested in cultivating an new gentry class in order to guide China to its
political maturity. Besides this point, he also correctly found that Leo Strauss provided a
bridge between ancient Chinese and ancient Western traditions.
Once published, Lilla’s article was quickly translated into Chinese and provoked
some discussions among intellectual circles. Wang Tao’s “Leo Strauss in China”6 was a
response both to Lilla and Mansfield. He criticized that Lilla’s “analysis of what he
4 Mark Lilla, The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics, New York, The New York Review of Books, 2001, 76.
5 Mark Lilla, “Reading Strauss in Beijing,” New Republic, 2010, accessed March 19, 2014.
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/79747/reading-leo-strauss-in-beijing-china-marx#.
6 Wang Tao, “Leo Strauss in China,” 80-82, accessed March 19, 2014,
http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1955/article_detail.asp. Wang Tao (王濤) is an assistant
professor in Division of Social Sciences, Fudan University in Shanghai, specializing in ancient philosophy
and political philosophy.
5observed is nonetheless faulty.”7 He then demonstrated that “the Chinese encounter
with Strauss is a meeting of classical mentalities,” and indirectly diluted the Westerners’
curiosity about the political implications of Chinese Straussians. This concise yet precise
article is the best one for the Western intellectuals to understand “Strauss fever” in
China.
Though many advantages can be discovered in these three articles, it is still
necessary for me to present a more detailed analysis of “Strauss fever” in China. Before
investigating Liu Xiaofeng’s and Gan Yang’s philosophy in detail, some important facts
about “Strauss fever” in China need to be described briefly.
7 Ibid, 80.
62. Strauss Fever: Context and Facts
China has a long history and a strong interest in absorbing Western thought. As
China was a country frequently impacted by Western and Japanese imperialism,
intellectuals, generation by generation, had no choice but to think: Why is the West
strong? Why is China weak? How can China survive in the modern world? Should we
still defend Confucianism, or should we learn from the West in order to protect
ourselves, just like what Japan had already done? Is modernity desirable or disastrous?
Keeping those questions in mind, in Late Qing Dynasty, an increasing number of
intellectuals started to see that Confucianism had lost its justification and was incapable
of defending China in the modern world. Enlightened by Herbert Spencer’s social
Darwinism, Mill’s On Liberty, Montesquieu’s critique of oriental despotism and
Rousseau’s democratic theory, the first generation of modern Chinese intellectuals and
revolutionaries overthrew the Ancien Régime and established a quasi liberal republic.
Inspired by Nietzsche’s philosophy of the Overman, John Dewey’s American
pragmatism and all liberal democratic theories attainable, the second generation of
intellectuals harshly criticized Confucianism and attempted to enlighten the entire
Chinese people. Obsessed by Marx’s scientific socialism and Lenin’s Bolshevism, the
third generation of intellectual-revolutionaries rejected the liberal project and founded
Communist China. Therefore, it is clear that Western thought stood behind almost every
political practice in China, and even today, Chinese intellectuals can not discuss Chinese
7issues without the aid of Western terminology.
The Post-Mao reform and opening up gradually diluted China’s communist
character and welcomed some Western-style practice, such as the establishment of the
market economy. In this new era, intellectuals gradually recognized that contemporary
China was confronted with two tasks: first, instituting Western liberal constitutional
principles to prevent the revival of Maoism and all other kinds of tyrannies, and second,
finding intellectual resources to resist the negative influence of modernization, such as
unconstrained mammonism, aimless hedonism, technological tyranny, and social
inequality. The contemporary Chinese intellectual landscape is thus a battlefield
between these two separate but interrelated concerns. Each person invites his/her own
Western intellectual hero and criticizes the others, making the Chinese debate a mirror
of the Western one. Until now, among the intellectual circles, liberalism and its
variations are the dominant philosophical and political discourses. However, liberals are
facing vigorous challenges from Maoists, New-Leftists and all kinds of conservatives
who support traditional values. Some intellectuals wish to simultaneously implement
liberalization and resist the diseases of modernity, and they choose either to synthesize
those two opposing aspects, or to express their different stances in accord with different
circumstances.
It was in this atmosphere that Strauss entered China. Chinese intellectuals are
interested in Western theories, and many of them have already read some most
8influential criticisms of modernity. In the 1980s and 1990s, Liu Xiaofeng and Gan Yang,
with other young scholars, rediscovered Nietzsche and also introduced Heidegger for
the first time. They even triggered a similar “Heidegger fever” in the 1980s. As they had
been familiar with contemporary continental philosophy, it seems that they would
encounter Leo Strauss sooner or later, because Strauss was also a follower of Nietzsche
and Heidegger. The well-known literary talent of Liu and Gan is also a good requisite
for the spread of any philosophy they admire.8
Actually, even before Liu’s and Gan’s introduction, Strauss’s name had appeared in
Chinese books. As early as 1985, a scholar translated a book containing Strauss’s “What
is Political Philosophy.”9 In 1993, the Straussian textbook History of Political Philosophy
was also translated.10 Eight years later, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes came out in a
Chinese version.11 However, those early introductions did not attract Chinese
intellectuals because they tended to regard Strauss merely as an ordinary scholar rather
than a philosopher.12
It was Liu Xiaofeng who first treated Strauss as a preeminent political philosopher.
8 Zhou Lian, “The Most Fashionable and the Most Relevant: A Review of Contemporary Chinese Political
Philosophy,” Diogenes, 56 (2009), 130.
9 English Version: James A. Gould & Vincent V. Thursby ed., Contemporary Political Thought, Holt, Reinhart
andWinston, 1969. Chinese Version:古尔德、瑟斯比：《现代政治思想》。Beijing, Commercial Press, 1985.
10 English Version: Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey ed., Histroy of Political Thought (3rd edition), Chicago, The
University of Chicago Press, 1987. Chinese Version:列奥·施特劳斯、约瑟夫·克罗波西编：《政治哲学史》（上
下）。Shijiazhuang: Hebei Renmin Press, 1993.
11 Englishi Version: Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis, Chicago, The
University of Chicago Press, 1963. Chinese Version:列奥·施特劳斯：《霍布斯的政治哲学》。Nanjing, Yilin
Press, 2001.
12 Zhang Xu, “Shitelaosi zai zhongguo” (“Strauss in China: a Review of the Researches and Debates on Leo
Strauss”), Jishou University Journal (Social Science), 24 (2003), 12.
9In 2001, Liu asked his friends to translate four articles of Strauss and published them in a
Hong Kong journal.13 Then, in 2002, another seven essays were translated into Chinese.14
In the meanwhile, Liu collected twenty-one secondary articles on Strauss written by
Western Straussians and edited a 775 page book, Strauss and Ancient Political Philosophy.15
Soon, in 2003, Strauss’s masterpiece, Natural Right and History, was published in China,
with Gan Yang’s eighty-two page preface introducing Strauss’s overall philosophy.16
Therefore, 2002 and 2003 were the prelude of “Strauss fever” in Mainland China.
In 2003, Liu found that a book series he had already created, “Classics and
Interpretations,” was a good base for him to implement the Straussian project. He
quickly published Allen Bloom’s Giants and Dwarfs,17 Seth Benardete’s The Bow and the
Lyre,18 and Stanley Rosen’s The Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry.19 In addition, he
also completed a new literal translation of Plato’s Symposium.20 Yet merely translating
the works of Strauss’s disciples was far from enough. From 2006, Liu created the “Leo
13 The four essays were “Jerusalem and Athens: Some Preliminary Reflections,” “The Mutual Influence of
Theology and Philosophy,” “How to Begin to Study Medieval Philosophy,” and “Exoteric Teaching,”
published in Dao feng: jidujiao wenhua pinglun道風：基督教文化評論 Logos & Pneuma: Chinese Journal of
Theology, 14 (2001).
14 He Zhaotian ed. Xifang xiandaixing: quzhe yu zhankai西方現代性：曲折與展開 (The Modernity of the West:
Complications and Development), Changchun, Jilin Renmin Press, 2002.
15 Liu Xiaofeng ed., Strauss and Ancient Political Philosophy, Shanghai, Shanghai SDX Press, 2002.
16 English Version: Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1953.
Chinese version:列奧·施特勞斯：《自然權利與歷史》。Beijing, SDX Press, 2003.
17 English Version: Allen Bloom, Giants and Dwarfs: Essays 1960-1990, Touchstone Books, 1991. Chinese
Version:布鲁姆：《巨人与侏儒：布鲁姆文集》。Beijing, Huaxia Press, 2003.
18 English Version: The Bow and the Lyre: a Platonic Reading of the Odyssey, Lanham, Rowman &Littlefield
Publishers, 1997. Chinese Version:伯纳德特：《弓弦与竖琴：从柏拉图解读奥德赛》。Beijing, Huaxia Press, 2003.
19 English Version: Stanley Rosen, The Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry, New York, Routledge, 1988.
Chinese Version:罗森：《诗与哲学之争》。Beijing, Huaxia Press, 2004.
20 Liu Xiaofeng, Bolatu de huiyin柏拉圖的會飲 (Plato’s Symposium), Beijing, Huaxia Press, 2003.
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Strauss Collection” as a sub-series under “Classics and Interpretations,” aiming to
publish Strauss’s original works and excellent secondary materials on him. Since 2010,
Liu’s group has accelerated the translating project and up to now published fifteen
books of Strauss’s writings. In addition, the “Classics and Interpretations” also
published literal translations and detailed interpretive works regarding Plato, Aristotle,
Xenophon, Rousseau and Nietzsche. Among them, the “Plato Commentary” is the most
mature sub-series. Liu’s ultimate goal is to translate Plato’s complete works directly
from Ancient Greek. A noteworthy phenomenon is that most of the secondary works
selected by Liu are written by Western Straussians. Nowadays, “Classics and
Interpretations” has become one of the largest and most popular book series in
Mainland China.
“Strauss fever” is the most controversial cultural phenomenon in the Post-Mao
period. It has lasted for over a decade, and is becoming increasingly energetic in present
day. Members of the movement have rapidly translated almost all of the works of
Strauss, including his correspondence with his contemporaries. This movement has
attracted more and more young students who admire Liu and led them to expand his
project,conduct classical studies, and criticize modernity.21 Because of this, it also
challenges the mainstream academia, questions established custom, and by so doing
irritates liberal intellectuals. Liu’s enthusiasm for Strauss, however, paid its price. Some
21 Xu Jian, “Siyan zhidian”斯言之玷：審視一個中國的施特勞斯門人 (“A Flaw in Speech: Examining a
Chinese Straussian”), Xu Jian ed, Gujin zhizheng yu wenming zijue (Quarrels between the Ancients and the
Moderns and the Self-consciousness of a Civilization: Leo Strauss in the Chinese Context), 302.
11
of his old friends from the 1980s broke with him. For example, Deng Xiaomang (邓晓
芒),22 the best Kant scholar and a Kantian Enlightenment promoter in China, accused Liu
of being a Nazi.23 In response, Liu also accused Deng of being a Nazi because Kant is
regarded by Berlin as a predecessor of Nazi ideology.24 Leaving those ad hominem
attacks aside, the next two chapters will show that Liu and Gan made sincere attempts
to apply Strauss’s philosophy in the Chinese context.
22 Deng Xiaomang is Professor of Philosophy at Wuhan University. He is the most authoritative translator of
Kant’s Three Critiques in China and has published many lengthy books regarding Kant, Hegel, and other
classical German philosophers. He is a liberal defending rational monism, and like Liu, harshly criticizes
Berlin, but from a different perspective.
23 Liu Suli (劉蘇里) & Deng Xiaomang, “Zhexuejia jintian de juese, Sept 19, 2010”哲學家今天的角色 (“The
Present-day Role of Philosophers, Sept 19, 2010”), accessed March 18, 2014,
www.aisixiang.com/data/37948.html.
24 Liu Xiaofeng, “Zhi bashi diandai de laoshuren dengxiaomang jiaoshou de xin, Nov. 2013”致八十年代老熟
人鄧曉芒教授的信 (“Letter to Professor Deng Xiaomang, My Acquaintance in the 1980s, Nov. 2013”),
accessed March 18, 2014, www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2013112095673.html.
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3. Liu Xiaofeng and Leo Strauss
Chinese intellectuals constantly bring the Western thinkers into the Chinese context
and “encourage” them to participate in Chinese debates. Therefore, the ultimate reason
for them to study Western thought is to deepen their understanding of the particular
Chinese situation. Liu Xiaofeng and Gan Yang are two such intellectuals. They creatively
received the work of Leo Strauss: On the one hand, Strauss changed some of their old
ideas; on the other hand, they developed new ideas that Strauss himself and Western
Straussians had not fully developed.
I have shown that Liu is the most important figure of the “Strauss fever” in China.
But who is Liu? How did he exercise such great influence in intellectual circles? Liu was
born in 1956 in Chongqing, a mountainous metropolis in southwestern China.
According to his own words, he was raised in a proletarian family, and started to do
hard manual labor when he was 12 under the strict oversight of his mother.25 After the
Cultural Revolution, he gained his bachelor degree in literature from Sichuan College of
Foreign Languages. His life changed when he was accepted by Peking University, where
he pursued his master’s degree in aesthetics, Western philosophy and Christian
theology. In 1985 and 1988, he published two of his most well-known books, Poetic
Philosophy and Salvation and Rambling, and shocked the entire intellectual circles in the
1980s when he advanced a revolutionary idea concerning Chinese culture -- Chinese
25 Liu Xiaofeng, “Tian bu sang siwen”天不喪斯文 (“Heaven Does Not Let the Cause of Truth Perish”),
accessed March 19, 2014, http://www.infzm.com/content/2940.
13
culture should be complemented and rectified by Christianity. In addition to those
personal achievements, he was also selected by Gan Yang as an associate editor of
“Culture: China and the World,” one of the most influential book series in the late 1980s.
While from 1989 to 1993, he left China and pursued his ThD in Die Universitaet Basel.
Then he went to Hong Kong and translated Christian theological works for a church-
funded institute. Now he has returned to Mainland China, and occupies faculty
positions both at Sun Yat-sen University in Canton and Renmin University in Beijing.
He is also an adjunct professor at Peking University.
Liu’s academic trajectory started from his reflections on the Post-Mao social
atmosphere of China. Different from many common people who celebrated the end of
the Maoist totalitarianism, Liu sensitively pointed out that there was a huge and serious
“vacancy of faith” in the 1980s. Following modern Western philosophers, he called this
vacancy “nihilism” and discovered that both China and the West had a common
responsibility to fight against this intellectual disease. In Salvation and Rambling, Liu
argued that the Post-Mao vacancy had to be filled, because absolute nihilism was as
dangerous as fake absolute values. Therefore, the rejection of old and hypocritical
Maoist values was precisely the starting point to find the “true, eternal, transhistorical
and hyperlocal” “Absolute Value” that could be effective in every culture.26 But where
does such a value come from? What substance can guarantee the effectiveness of this
26 Liu Xiaofeng, Zhengjiu yu xiaoyao拯救与逍遥 (Salvation and Rambling: Different Worldviews between Chinese
and Western Poets), Shanghai, Shanghai Renmin Press, 1988, 30.
14
value? Liu’s answer shocked most of the Chinese intellectuals and even many
Westerners: Only the all-loving and all-embracing Christian God can give Absolute
Value, because the transcendence of God can redeem every individual from the abyss of
desperation and endow common life with an other-worldly meaning.
Faith in Christ is a miracle occurring in the individual body, or in other words,
a mystery in the individual body but also a boundlessly beautiful happening --
Pascal named it God’s bestowal. Faith in Christ makes the divine grace enter the
innermost of each individual, and makes the soul of the individual integrate with
the boundless, warm, loving God.27
However, following Max Weber’s studies on comparative religions, Liu contended
that Chinese culture lacked this transcendental dimension, making China most
vulnerable in the face of nihilism. Compared to Christianity, the ultimate idea of
Confucianism and Daoism, the two mainstream thoughts constructing Chinese culture,
was the ontological unity of man and a personified yet undivine heaven, which was
incapable of providing all-embracing love from outside of the world to appease
individual desperation.28 Inspired by Soren Kierkegaard who differentiated three stages
of life, Liu also claimed that Chinese culture regarded aesthetics and ethics as the
27 Liu Xiaofeng, Zou xiang shizijia shang de zhen走向十字架上的真 (Towards the Truth of the Cross), Shanghai,
Shanghai SDX Press, 1995, 133-34. Translated by Fredrik Faellman in his Salvation and Modernity: Intellectuals
and Faith in Contemporary China (Revised Edition), Lanham, University Press of America, 2008, 56.
28 Liu Xiaofeng, Zhengjiu yu xiaoyao (Salvation and Rambling), 165-66.
15
highest values but that both were actually lower than the religious value.29
After this pessimistic depiction of Chinese culture, Liu concluded that it was a
misfortune for Chinese to have deviated from God’s redemption in their long history
because Chinese individuals, purely as individuals, also needed the love of God to
redeem their pain. China, he argued, had to turn to Christianity to rectify itself. This turn,
in his view, however, did not mean replacing Chinese culture with Western religion.
“Judaist culture, Greek culture and Roman culture are, like Chinese culture, national-
provincial cultures which have their particular genealogies of ideas. [However,]
Christian culture is not a national-provincial culture,” because it promoted universal
brotherhood and individual redemption. Therefore, Liu argued that the meeting
between Christianity with Chinese culture was not a clash between two mutually
exclusive national ideas, but an encounter between God and every Chinese individual.30
Following Karl Barth and Max Scheler and criticizing the cultural anthropologists, Liu
took an obvious anti-nationalistic stance and argued that Chinese people should
welcome this intellectual “conversion” and abandon their “corrupt historical root” that
led them to “depart from the Heavenly Father.”31 Therefore, a “Sino-theology” was
needed. This theology should not be a merger between Christian doctrines and
29 Ibid, 37-40.
30 Liu Xiaofeng, Dao yu yan: huaxia wenhua yu jidu wenhua xiangyu道与言：华夏文化与基督文化相遇 (Dao and
Logos: The Meeting between Chinese and Christian Cultures), Shanghai, Shanghai SDX Press, 1995, 3.
31 Liu Xiaofeng, Zhengjiu yu xiaoyao (Salvation and Rambling), 17& 25.
16
traditional Chinese culture, but merely “the creation of the Holy Word in Chinese.”32
Possessing those theories, in the 1980s and 1990s, Liu and his intellectual
companions and followers claimed they were “cultural Christians,” which means that
they did not affiliate to any particular denomination but believed in God. Like Leo
Strauss, Liu tried his best to resist nihilism, a disease generated from modernization, but
he did not regard modernity as a purely bad thing. As one can see, many of his theories
were similar to modern liberal values, such as his interpretation of Christian faith as a
direct connection between God and individuals without any intermediate support from
church or state, his cosmopolitan worldview, and his negative assessment of traditional
Chinese culture.
Liu’s research on Christian theology lasted for a long period. According to an
autobiographical essay, he said that “After Salvation and Rambling (1988), under the
support of the absolutism of Scheler’s value phenomenology, I stepped forward to
Christian theology, and my strict absolutist stance became more and more strict. Then,
through Scheler’s sociology of knowledge, I turned to Weber’s and Manheim’s social
theories in order to understand the root of value relativism.”33 From modern sociology,
around 1998, he further stepped into political philosophy, and met Isaiah Berlin, the
relativist, and Charles Taylor, the multiculturalist. His lecture in 1998 on Taylor showed
32 Liu Xiaofeng, Dao yu yan (Dao and Logos), 8. Translated by Fredrik Faellman, Salvation and Modernity, 55.
33 Liu Xiaofeng, “Ciwei de wenshun: xuyan (June 2000)”刺猬的溫順：序言 (“Preface to ‘the Moderation of
the Hedgehog’ (June 2000)”), Gujin zhizheng yu wenming zijue (The Quarrels between the Ancients and the
Moderns and the Self-consciousness of Civilization), 35-36.
17
that he was a defender of classical Lockean liberalism: He criticized Taylor for claiming
collective cultural rights rather than defending individual rights. Under the mask of
communitarian liberalism, Liu argued, Taylor replaced political liberty with the equality
between different ethnic groups. But Liu thought that this approach was as dangerous
as Hegel and Rousseau because an emphasis on the collective character of an ethnic
group would inevitably restrict and reduce individual freedom. He then criticized some
Chinese intellectuals who, like Taylor, were attempting to create nationalistic liberal
theories and to search for “non-Western modernity,” a term that Liu totally denied. In
contrast, Liu regarded modernity as an undeniable reality, and he stated that Chinese
intellectuals had no choice but to participate in this universal and necessary tendency
rather than pursuing special national characters.34
Therefore, up to 1998, Liu was a liberal defending universal individual human
rights rather than multiculturalism. He stopped talking so much about Christianity,
making his universalism and individualism increasingly secularized. However, as
liberal individualism does not presuppose a unity of value, we can discover a tension
within Liu’s thought between his “strict absolutism” and his limited permission of value
relativism.
Almost in the same year, Liu encountered the thought of Carl Schmitt, and from
Heinlich Meier’s papers on Schmitt and Leo Strauss, he started to take the latter
34 Liu Xiaofeng, “Pingdeng de chongxin fenpei zhenli?”平等地重新分配真理？ (“Equally Redistributing the
Truth?”), Ciwei de wenshun刺猬的溫順 (The Moderation of the Hedgehog), Shanghai, Shanghai Literature and
Art Press, 2002, 38-39.
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“political philosopher” seriously. Actually as early as 1994, Liu had known Strauss and
briefly read the Preface and Epilogue of History of Political Philosophy. He was shocked by
Strauss because he believed that “Strauss’s unremitting struggle with value relativism
and nihilism [were] the same as my stance in Salvation and Rambling. How am I so close
with this man!”35 However, as he was temporarily occupied by Scheler and Weber, he
did not read Strauss intensively until reading Meier. At this time, Liu discovered new
ideas in Strauss other than his anti-nihilistic thoughts -- the tension between philosophy
and the city, and the related tension between reason (Athens) and revelation (Jerusalem).
On the one hand, Liu’s introduction of Strauss was comprehensive and deep. From
the quotations in Liu’s essays, we can see that he has read almost all of the works of
Strauss with plenty of secondary materials written by Strassians and other independent
scholars. On the other hand, Liu has been obsessed by Strauss’s special thought on the
subtle situation of the philosopher in the face of the religion and laws of a political
society.36 He repeated this idea in every essay and every lecture, and he also practiced the
Straussian hermeneutics to analyze the esoteric teachings of every thinker he found
interesting. In his first, seventy page essay on Strauss, “The Moderation of the
Hedgehog,” Liu began his introduction of Strauss with a fictitious debate he designed
35 Liu Xiaofeng, “Ciwei de wenshun xuyan” (“Preface to ‘the Moderation of the Hedgehog’”), Gujin zhizheng
yu wenming zijue, 35
36 It is not clear why Liu found this idea such fascinating. In addition to the charm of this idea itself, we
cannot find any words from his essays showing that he met any problems in his life similar to the Straussian
philosopher. More interestingly, without any hesitation, after encountering Strauss, he quickly identified
himself as a follower of the Straussian philosopher who was on the side of Athens, as if he forgot that for a
long time he had been a Christian theologian who was on the side of Jerusalem.
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between Isaiah Berlin and Leo Strauss which resulted in a total triumph of the latter. Liu
admitted Berlin’s proposition that values were always in conflict, but he rejected Berlin’s
relativist solution and defended Strauss’s return to the ancient definition of philosophy,
that philosophy was a way of life pursuing truth but not possessing truth, and that
philosophers had the responsibility to discover the “natural right” or the happy life in
the face of different social conventions.37 This defense of philosophy as a defense against
nihilism can be regarded as a restatement of Liu’s early absolutist stance.
However, after this brief description of the quarrel between ancient and modern
political philosophy, Liu quickly turned to the introduction to the “theologico-political
conflict between the Athenian philosopher and the multitude” in ancient political
society. The virtue of the philosopher as an endless questioning of the “nature” (physis)
by his unaided human reason inevitably challenges the virtue of the multitude as the
obedience of the social conventions (nomos) supported by authority, law and religion.
Therefore, ancient philosophers invented a mask, exoteric writing, in order to protect
themselves, because the special way of life of the philosopher would irritate the
multitude and in turn threaten his own life. The death of Socrates was a good example.
In addition, this mask also signifies a social responsibility of the philosopher not to
overthrow the “value of the multitude,” both because the philosopher pursues but can
never “determine” what good values are, and because the philosophic reason can never
37 Liu Xiaofeng, “Ciwei de wenshun” (“The Moderation of the Hedgehog”), Shitelaosi de lubiao施特劳斯的路
标 (Strauss’s Pathmark), Beijing, Huaxia Press, 2013, 34-40.
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totally refute the validity of revelation as the basis of social morality. Therefore, in
addition to the “egoist” self-protection, the philosopher should also altruistically respect,
though not agree with, the social conventions. Once philosophers replace religion with
reason as the very foundation of the political society, modernity starts to evolve wave by
wave, from the classical theory of natural rights to the reason of history, and finally to
German nihilism and relativism.
Liu’s later essays on Strauss mainly focus on Strauss’s particular books or essays,
but he never abandoned his interest in the tension between philosophy and the city. In
the meantime, praising the Straussian philosopher, he also repeatedly accused modern
and contemporary Chinese intellectuals of engaging in politics too deeply. He claimed
that the essay “The Moderation of the Hedgehog” was a valediction to the “cultural
spirit since 1919, and even the philosophical spirit since 1789.”38 According to Liu’s
observation, contemporary Chinese public opinion has been occupied and divided by
modern “isms” -- liberalism, conservatism, neo-leftism and post-modernism, and every
ism strongly interferes with Chinese politics.39 This depiction corresponds, though Liu
did not quote it, with Strauss’s warning that “the philosopher ceases to be a philosopher
at the moment at which the ‘subjective certainty’ of a solution becomes stronger than his
awareness of the problematic character of that solution. At that moment the sectarian is
38 Liu Xiaofeng, “Preface,” Shitelaosi de lubiao (Strauss’s Pathmark), i. On May 4th, 1919, liberal Chinese
intellectuals and students led a patriotic movement to resist the Japanese occupation of Shandong Province.
As the leaders were radical thinkers who attempted to overthrow the old Confucian morality, 1919 or May
4th became a symbol of China’s “modern spirit.”
39 Liu Xiaofeng, “Introduction,” Shitelaosi de lubiao (Strauss’s Pathmark), 9-10.
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born.”40 Liu further called this sectarianism the “corruption of the intellectuals.”41
Following Strauss instead of Kojeve, he indicated that he would retreat from politics and
cultivate his “classical mentality” by reading great books rather than concerning himself
with Chinese reform like liberal intellectuals.42 Only by breaking the intense connection
between philosophy and politics can philosophy return to its ancient but original sense,
and Liu wanted himself to be a model of the Straussian philosopher in the Chinese
context.
But here we have to ask: Strauss said that we should revive ancient political
philosophy to search for the “natural right,” but he also said that the philosopher could
never reach the truth, therefore, is philosophy as effective as Liu’s “Sino-theology” in
resisting nihilism? Liu gave an interesting account in a footnote in his essay analyzing
Strauss’s “Exoteric teaching.” He accepted that the Straussian philosopher might be a
nihilist because he was constantly skeptical, but he defined “anti-nihilism” not as
maintaining the Absolute Value, but as limiting nihilism to the philosophical circle and
never letting the multitude know that truth.43 Therefore, it seems that Liu regarded the
“retreat from politics” per se as an adequate fulfillment of the philosopher’s
responsibility of resisting nihilism, beyond which the Straussian philosopher has no
40 Leo Strauss, “Restatement on Xenophone’s Hiero,”WPP, 116.
41 Liu Xiaofeng, “Shitelaosi yu zhongguo”施特劳斯与中国 (“Strauss and China: the Meeting of Classical
Mentalities”), Shitelaosi de lubiao (Strauss’s Pathmark), 345-46.
42 Liu Xiaofeng, “Shitelaosi yihuo keyefu”施特劳斯抑或科耶夫 (“Strauss or Kojeve?”), Jianjin hanzhi拣尽寒
枝 (Picking up the Winter Branches), Beijing, Huaxia Press, 2013, 160-161.
43 Liu Xiaofeng, “Xueren de dexing”学人的德性 (“The Virtue of Intellectuals”), Shitelaosi de lubiao, 330-331.
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duty to participate in politics.
However, Liu’s overemphasis on the philosopher’s self-retreat created a further
problem. In a society where social morality is perverted by a tyrant, will the philosopher
exercise his political influence? Liu nowhere answered this question, but actually Strauss
permitted the philosopher’s social role of rectifying politics, for he said that “it is of the
essence of political life to be guided by a mixture of political knowledge and political
opinion. Here, all political life is accompanied by more or less coherent and more or less
strenuous efforts to replace political opinion by political knowledge.”44 By so doing, the
philosopher “will improve rather than subvert the city.”45 Moreover, as the philosopher
is man rather than god, he has a natural attachment with human beings, and for this
reason, he “will try to help his fellow man by mitigating, as far as in him lies, the evils
which are inseparable from the human condition. In particular, he will give advice to his
city or to other rulers.” Simonides talked to the tyrant Hiero; Socrates talked to
Alcibiades and young Pericles -- those are good examples of the Straussian
philosopher’s political influence.46 Therefore, unlike Liu’s interpretation, detachment
from politics is not the ultimate good of the Straussian philosopher. Even though the
philosopher knows clearly that the evil rooted in the human condition can never be
eradicated, he is not a fatalist who gives up all human initiative.
Though the philosopher can exercise political influence, according to Strauss, we
44 Leo Strauss, “What is Political Philosophy,”WPP, 15.
45 Leo Strauss, “A Giving of Accounts,” JPCM, 463.
46 Leo Strauss, “Restatement on Xenophone’s Hiero,”WPP, 120.
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should not entrust any political project to the philosopher. The maintenance of social
virtue and the resistance of the unrestrained nihilism depend more on religion in the
form of laws. But we necessarily meet a further problem in the face of the fact that the
world is divided into different religions and social conventions, and of Strauss’s
endorsement of this division in his thoughts on the “closed societies.” (NRH, OT)
Therefore, it seems that no effective force can resist relativism, because the philosopher
should not replace social conventions with his knowledge, and because different
religions disagree with each other about the contents of morality.
Liu continued to keep silent on this problem. Retreating from politics, Liu
emphasized over and over again that religions even superstitions of the multitude must
be maintained because even the worst rule of superstition was better than the “tyranny
of reason.”47 However, he said nothing about whether there was a “universal morality”
that was guaranteed by religion instead of philosophy. In fact, Strauss had some words
on this problem. He articulated that the morality of the multitude should be maintained
by conventions and laws generating from religion, and he also implied that a
revelational religion could generate “universal morality.”48 In “Preface to Spinoza’s
Critique of Religion” where he touched the topic of Jerusalem and Athens, he said,
God’s revealing Himself to man, His addressing man, is not merely known
through traditions going back to the remote past and therefore now “merely
47 Liu Xiaofeng, “Xueren de dexing” (“The Virtue of Intellectuals”), Shitelaosi de lubiao, 330.
48 Leora Batnitzky, “Leo Strauss and the ‘Theologico-Political Predicament,’” Steven Smith ed. The Cambridge
Companion to Leo Strauss, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 56-60.
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believed,” but is genuinely known through present experience which every human
being can have if he does not refuse himself to it. This experience is not a kind of
self-experience,... but of something undesired, coming from the outside, going
against man’s grain. It is the only awareness of something absolute which cannot be
relativized in any way as everything else, rational or non-rational, can; ... it is the
experience of an unequivocal command addressed to me here and now as
distinguished from general laws or ideas which are always disputable and
permitting of exceptions. Only by surrendering to God’s experienced call which
calls for one’s loving Him with all one’s heart, with all one’s soul, and all one’s
might can one come to see the other human being as one’s brother and love him as
oneself.49
Several pages later, Strauss even further claimed that “the experience of God is
surely not specially Jewish.”50 Therefore, it can be seen that Strauss regarded a universal
experience of God’s revelation as the basis of the universal morality. Moreover, the more
striking thing is that this idea has an obvious similarity to Liu’s early thoughts in his
“Cultural Christian” period, because Liu also regarded faith as a transcendental
experience of the all-embracing God “coming from the outside.”
It is not a “mistake” for Liu not to introduce this particular dimension of Strauss’s
thought in his essays. However, new problems started to emerge when Liu applied
49 Leo Strauss, “Preface to SCR,” SCR, 8-9.
50 Ibid, 11.
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Strauss’s theory in the special Chinese context. Before introducing Liu’ application, we
must ask: Did Strauss know that China did not have a corresponding revelational
religion?
Actually Strauss knew. In his “An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism,” a
unique place where he touched comparative philosophy between the East and the West,
Strauss said that the Westerners must learn from China to overcome the tyranny of
modern rationalism. He then asserted that the Biblical tradition as the East within the
West shared similarity with the Chinese tradition, not because China also had a
revelational religion, but because China regarded “to be” as “to be elusive or to be a
mystery,” which was similar to the Biblical understanding but was in opposition to the
Western rationalists who regarded “to be” as “to be always present” and to be
“accessible to man.” Therefore, Strauss concluded that “the possibility of a world
religion” should be founded not on the ground of Western rationalism (whether ancient
or modern), but on an Eastern understanding of “Being” simultaneously including both
the Biblical and the Chinese traditions.51
After analyzing Strauss’s own words on the universal morality and “a world
religion” which are not relativistic, we may anticipate two approaches Liu may take to
apply Strauss’s thought in the Chinese context. First, Liu may use Strauss’s thought on
the universal experience of revelation to reinforce his early stance in Salvation and
51 Leo Strauss, “An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism,” RCPR, 43-44.
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Rambling that China should accept God’s Holy Word. Second, Liu may change his early
stance and start to reevaluate the Chinese tradition in order to find the common attitude
toward “Being” between the Bible and the Confucian-Daoist thought. However, as Liu
had never paid special attention to Strauss’s thought on “world religion,” he silently
denied either of the approaches and developed his third one. Enlightened by Strauss’s
thought on “closed societies” and “exoteric teaching,” Liu attempted to rediscover the
“Chinese nomos” as a counterpart of Western conventions, and to reinterpret Chinese
intellectual history as a tension between the philosopher and the political society.
One of the reasons why Liu was quickly obsessed by Strauss is that, according to
Liu, esotericism was also an art of writing employed by ancient Chinese sages for
thousands of years. In Analects, Liu discovered sentences showing that Confucius had
noticed that truth should not be told to everyone: “The Master said, When a man may be
spoken with, not to speak to him is to err in reference to the man. When a man may not
be spoken with, to speak to him is to err in reference to our words. The wise err neither
in regard to their man nor to their words.”52 According to Liu, this “unfrank” attitude of
Confucius led to the most important distinction in Chinese thought, i.e. the distinction
between “Weiyan” (微言 ) and “Dayi” (大義 ), which respectively corresponded to
esoteric and exoteric teachings. Confucius employed this art when he was writing Spring
52 “Wei Ling Gong,” The Analects論語·衛靈公, translated by James Legge, accessed March 19,
http://ctext.org/analects/wei-ling-gong. Liu Xiaofeng, “Liuyi shengren zan, May 2000”六譯聖人贊 (“In
Honor of Liuyi the Sage, May 2000”), Zhe yidairen de pa he ai這一代人的怕和愛 (The Fear and Love of This
Generation), Beijing, Huaxia Press, 2007, 162-63.
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and Autumn (春秋), the first Chinese chronicle. Then, Kung-Yang (公羊學派), a special
hermeneutic school interpreting this chronicle, aimed to uncover the esoteric teachings
(Weiyan) through reading between lines precisely like what Strauss had done. But why
did Confucius conceal the truth of his thought? One of the reason is that the “noble
men” the chronicle praised and criticized were powerful rulers who would persecute
Confucius and his disciples.53 Due to this dangerous situation, “Intelligent is he and wise
/ Protecting his own person.”54 But this is not the only reason. Furthermore, as there is an
unbridgeable gap between the morality of the multitude and the sage, it is inappropriate
for the latter to publicize the truth which might result in the total disintegration of the
society into a situation of “floods and beasts.” According to Liu, this is why Confucius
and Mencius said that “the people... may not be made to understand it”55 and that
“words do not have to be sincere.”56
Inheriting his early opinion that Confucianism and Daoism were ultimately the
same, Liu observed a parallel phenomenon in Daoist works. Following Xu Fancheng,57 a
modern Chinese philosopher Liu admired, Liu interpreted Laozi’s Tao-Te Ching as a
53 “Yi Wen Zhi,” Han Shu漢書·藝文志. Liu Xiaofeng, “Liuyi shengren zan” (“In Honor of Liuyi the Sage”),
Zhe yidairen de pa he ai, 163.
54 “Zheng Min, Greater Odes of the Kingdom,” Book of Poetry詩經·大雅·烝民, translated by James Legge,
accessed March 19, 2014, http://ctext.org/book-of-poetry/decade-of-sheng-min.
55 “Tai Bo,” The Analects論語·泰伯, translated by James Legge, accessed March 19,
http://ctext.org/analects/tai-bo.
56 “Li Lou II,”Mencius孟子·離婁下. Liu Xiaofeng, “Nicai de weiyan dayi”尼采的微言大義 (“The Weiyan
and Dayi of Nietzsche”), Ciwei de wenshun, 83.
57 Xu Fanzheng (徐梵澄, 1909-2000) was a student of Lu Xun, known as the greatest writer in modern China.
Xu was both a commentator and a translator. He studied Western, Chinese and Indian philosophy. What
made Xu an academic celebrity in China might be his translation of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra
(published in 1935). He was the first Chinese scholar who completely translated this book. Besides this
accomplishment, he was also a commentator of many ancient Chinese texts, such as Tao Te Ching.
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teaching that the sage should not challenge the conventions, even superstitious
conventions, of the multitude. As Laozi said, “We should blunt our sharp points, and
unravel the complications of things; we should attemper our brightness, and bring
ourselves into agreement with the obscurity of others.”58 The sage should disguise
himself as a member of the multitude, while using a special “manner of writing” to
express their ideas.
Paralleling Strauss’s “quarrel between the ancients and the moderns,” Liu also
implied that even before the nineteenth century when modern forces came to China, a
transformation of the sage’s attitude toward the multitude had taken place. In the
twelfth century when China was under the rule of Song Dynasty, some Neo-Confucians
lost the moderation of the ancient sages, rejected the distinction between “Weiyan” and
“Dayi,” and alleged that “everybody can be Yao and Shun.”59 In the view of Liu, this
statement symbolized a democratic revolution within the Confucian tradition,60 and
Mao Tse-Tung was actually a secret successor of the spirit of Neo-Confucianism even
though he claimed himself to be a worshiper of communism. The Cultural Revolution as
interpreted by Liu was thus essentially a movement of “collective sage-cultivation”
which was a total disaster for the country.61
58 Tao-Te Ching老子·道篇, translated by James Legge, accessed March 19 2014, http://ctext.org/dao-de-jing.
Liu Xiaofeng, “Shengren de xujing, Nov. 2001”聖人的虛靜 (“The Tranquility of the Sage, Nov. 2001”),
Jianjin Hanzhi, 235-36.
59 Yao and Shun were sage-kings in ancient Chinese myths and Confucian stories. They were regarded as
the moral models of Confucianism.
60 Liu Xiaofeng, “Liuyi shengren zan” (“In Honor of Liuyi the Sage”), Zhe yidairen de pa he ai, 161.
61 Liu Xiaofeng, “Nicai de weiyan dayi” (“The Weiyan and Dayi of Nietzsche”), Ciwei de wenshun, 83.
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If the sage should not challenge the multitude, then what did the sage endorse in his
exoteric teachings? Obviously he endorsed the moral doctrines that the multitude must
obey. But what was the basis of the morality of the multitude? According to Liu, that
basis is the Chinese “ritual-law” (禮法 Lifa) tradition containing a whole system of
costumes, moral principles and political obligations rather than legal articles which were
impartially enforced by punishment. Different from the authoritative opinion in
contemporary Chinese academia that this system was similar to the Platonic “ideas,” Liu
argued that it was actually a counterpart of the Western nomos. He further argued that
“Confucianism was neither philosophy of ‘idea’ (metaphysics) nor religion (theology),
but ‘the study of ritual-law.’ Similarly, traditional Jewish study was neither philosophy
nor theology of faith, but ‘the study of law’ (Torah Study).”62 This system of “ritual-law”
constituted the social bond and ethical rules that prevent society from degenerating.
Therefore, in a manner, similar to Strauss, Liu also built a bridge between the Biblical
and Chinese traditions. But in contrast to Strauss, Liu emphasized the social function of
these traditions rather than their common understanding of “Being” as an inexpressible
mystery.
If the Chinese “ritual-law” corresponds to the Biblical law, then the aforementioned
Chinese sage must correspond to the Straussian philosopher. Liu never denied this
analogy, and he asserted that both Confucian and Daoist sages were philosophers.
62 Liu Xiaofeng, “Shengren de xujing” (“The Tranquility of the Sage, Nov. 2001”), Jianjin Hanzhi, 219.
30
However, it has been a controversial issue for a hundred of years whether traditional
China had any narrowly defined “philosophers.” According to Strauss, Western
philosophy generated from the discovery of “nature,” i.e. things that were neither
created by gods nor produced by human beings but could be discovered by human
reason. Though political philosophy is different from natural philosophy, it still
presumes the political realm or human world as “nature” which could be studied in a
similar way by human reason. The task of the philosopher is to find the best way of life
and the complete knowledge of the world through asking “what is.” As Strauss said,
Socrates “always conversed about ‘what is pious, what is impious, what is noble, what is
base, what is just, what is unjust, what is sobriety, what is madness, what is courage,
what is cowardice, what is the city, what is the statesman, what is rule over men, what is
a man able to rule over men,’ and similar things.” Those questions are “meant to bring
to light the nature of the kind of thing in question, that is, the form or the character of
the thing.”63 This means that the answer to the question of “what is” should not be an
occasional or accidental feature of a thing, but the innermost “essence” that determines
the “nature.”
Strictly following Strauss’s definition of philosophy and the philosopher, now we
can start to investigate why Liu treated Chinese sages as philosophers. Liu admitted that
“Zhe-Xue” (哲学), the Chinese translation of philosophy, was actually an invention by
63 Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsy, HPP, 4-5.
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modern Japanese scholars. Ancient Chinese language did not have this word. However,
following Liao Ping,64 a modern commentator of Confucian classics, Liu argued that
Confucius was a philosopher, and that the Confucian classical studies were philosophic
studies. Why? According to Liu, like Socrates and Plato, Confucius was “a legislator,
caring about and investigating what the ideal life and just order are.”65 In addition,
Confucius also concerned about things that beyond the human world. Therefore, Liu
concluded that Confucius had “double esoteric teachings,” i.e. the “doctrine of the
Human” (人學 Renxue) conveying the theory of the ideal politics as a “Great Harmony”
(大同 Datong) ruled by the sage-king, and the “doctrine of the Heaven” (天學 Tianxue)
promoting the ultimate unity of the individual and the Heaven. The latter doctrine is
higher than the former, but neither should be told to the multitude.66
Therefore, in Liu’s opinion, Confucius and other similar sages can be regarded as
philosophers because all of them pursued the ideal life like Socrates and Plato did.
However, while emphasizing this similarity, Liu kept silent on many crucial differences
between Chinese sages and Straussian philosophers. The Straussian philosopher
pursues truth and the ideal life by asking and answering “what is” to discover the
essence of things. In contrast, even though Chinese sages ask “what is,” they never give
64 Liao Ping (廖平, 1852-1932) was a Confucian commentator who interpreted Confucianism in a special way.
His intellectual trajectory had “six changes,” each one denied the preceding ones. In his later ages, his
interpretation of Confucius became increasingly peculiar and unconventional. For this reason, the
mainstream Confucian scholars regarded him as a charlatan. However, Liu Xiaofeng spoke highly of Liao
because he discovered that Liao was actually a Straussian philosopher who was capable of decoding the
“esoteric teachings” of Confucius.
65 Liu Xiaofeng, “Liuyi shengren zan” (“In Honor of Liuyi the Sage”), Zhe yidairen de pa he ai, 162.
66 Ibid, 163-64.
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definite definitions. As Tang Shiqi67 said, Chinese sages “tend to describe the unfolding
or ‘disclosing’ of a thing in giving circumstances, and encourage people to get their own
understanding of it. People cannot exhaust all concrete circumstances, thus Confucius
asks his disciples to know the three corners of a square through one corner.”68 For this
reason, when being asked about what is “Ren” (仁 benevolence), the perfect virtue in
Confucian ethics, Confucius gave various answers such as “to love all men”69 and “to
subdue one’s self and return to propriety.”70 He even explained this concept through
concrete examples: “When you go abroad, to behave to every one as if you were
receiving a great guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice;
not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself; to have no murmuring
against you in the country, and none in the family.”71 “In retirement, to be sedately
grave; in the management of business, to be reverently attentive; in intercourse with
others, to be strictly sincere.”72 Hence, there is a significant difference between Confucius
and Socrates.73 Actually, when discussing Laozi’s Daoism, Liu conceded that Laozi was
67 Tang Shiqi (唐士其) is Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies at Peking
University, specializing in Western political philosophy, Chinese philosophy, comparative political
philosophy and comparative politics. He is an independent Straussian who encountered Leo Strauss’s
works during his post-doctorate study at Tokyo University in Japan.
68 Tang Shiqi, “Zhongdao yu quanliang”中道與權量 (“Moderation and Measuring: Traditional Chinese
Wisdom and Classical Rationalism in the View of Strauss”), Studies in International Politics國際政治研究, 2
(2011), 116-117.
69 “Yan Yuan,” The Analects論語·顏淵, translated by James Legge, accessed March 19, 2014,
http://ctext.org/analects/yan-yuan.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 “Zi Lu,” The Analects論語·子路, translated by James Legge, accessed March 19, 2014,
http://ctext.org/analects/zi-lu.
73 A joke in China may best illuminate this difference:
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not a metaphysician in strict sense because he refused to give a theory of the cosmos. But
he still affirmed that Laozi was a philosopher inasmuch as he studied the ideal politics
like Confucius and a Platonic philosopher-king.74
After analyzing Confucius’s “doctrine of the Human,” we can turn to his “doctrine
of the Heaven.” Liu might argue that this teaching corresponds to natural philosophy
pursing the knowledge of the nature as a whole. However, Liu kept silent again about
the difference between the East and the West. While the Straussian philosopher pursues
the truth as the knowledge of the whole, the Chinese sages do not care too much about
“knowing.” As Liu interpreted, the teaching of the Heaven was the sage’s ultimate unity
with the Heaven. But in fact, this Heaven is not an object of cognition, but an object of
mysterious experience that cannot be described theoretically. Furthermore, it is also
inappropriate to call the “Heaven” an object, because the ultimate unity of the sage and
the Heaven denies the epistemological subject-object distinction. The sage who
peacefully lives in this unity is called “the true man” (真人 Zhenren), but obviously, this
meaning of “true” is totally different from the Socratic sense of truth.
Socrates: What is Ren?
Confucius: To subdue yourself and return to propriety.
Socrates (asks a second time): What is Ren?
Confucius: When you go abroad, to behave to every one as if you were receiving a great guest; to employ the
people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice; not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself; to have no
murmuring against you in the country, and none in the family.
Socrates: My dear Confucius! When I ask you what is Ren, you seem to reluctant to point out its nature and
merely enumerate its accidental circumstances. But you have never told me its essence. Please tell me frankly: What Is
Ren?
Confucius: Director! The scenario must be wrong!
74 Liu Xiaofeng, “Shengren de xujing” (“The Tranquility of the Sage”), Jianjin Hanzhi, 214-18.
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Due to those problems, Liu’s interpretation has not been accepted by the
mainstream Chinese academia, even not by other independent scholars who admire
Strauss. For example, Kai Marchal75 was delighted to see that there was a concord
between Strauss and Chinese thought, but he questioned on whether China had the
same tension between philosophy and the city. “The Chinese [intellectual] tradition
lacked the Socratic ‘dialectics’ or ‘insoluble questions’ (aporia), nor did it have a habit of
exhaustive questioning. Therefore, challenging the conventional authority was not a
matter of course [for Chinese sages].”76 Tang Shiqi agreed with Marchal: “Different from
the tradition of Western philosophy, ancient Chinese wisdom knows nothing of the
distinction between essence and phenomenon, truth and opinion. People do not use
different concepts, logics, and perspectives to understand political and trans-political
phenomena, rather, they would know the entire universe, including human behavior, as
a continuous spectrum.”77 Those particular features of Chinese thought may avoid the
appearance of the tension between the philosopher and the political society in ancient
China.
Facing those difficulties, a later essay shows that Liu made a striking concession,
whether intentionally or unintentionally. Following Strauss’s account of Western
75 Kai Marchal (Chinese name:馬愷之Ma Kaizhi) is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Soochow
University (東吳大學) in Taipei, specializing in Chinese philosophy, political philosophy, and ethics. He got
his PhD in 2006 from Die Universitaet Muenchen in Chinese studies (Sinologie) and philosophy.
76 Kai Marchal, “Zhongguo de shitelaosi sixiang zhiqu”中國的施特勞斯思想旨趣 (“On Leo Strauss Studies
in China”), Zhongguo tushu pinglun中國圖書評論 (Chinese Book Reviews), 81 (2008). For a German version, see
“Die ‘eigentlich konfuzianische Verschärfung’ – Leo Strauss und China,” minima sinica 2007/1, 1-14.
77 Tang Shiqi, “Zhongdao yu quanliang” (“Moderation and Measuring”), 115.
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intellectual history, Liu pointed out that there was a tension between philosophy and
religion in ancient Greek. The falling of the Greek city-states was not the funeral of
philosophy, because philosophy entered Judaism, Christianity and Islam during the
Hellenistic and Medieval ages. (Liu must have Maimonides, Greek church fathers,
Thomas Aquinas and Al-Farabi in mind.) When modernity had become an aeipathia,
philosophy entered the last old religion -- Confucianism. Therefore, Chinese intellectuals
should study how Judaism, Christianity and Islam reacted to the impact of philosophy
in order to contemplate how Confucianism should respond to its modern dilemma.78
Interestingly, this statement almost overturned all of his preceding interpretations of
Chinese intellectual history because here he redefined Confucianism as a religion and
even claimed that the entering of philosophy in China was a modern incident, which
meant that Chinese did not have indigenous philosophic activity in its ancient history.
However, as Liu still has not published any new books or articles reinterpreting ancient
Chinese thought in accord with the Straussian approach, we cannot know Liu’s most
recent intellectual development on this topic.
Though controversial, Liu has made a reasonable attempt to introduce Strauss and
to apply his philosophy in the Chinese context. Before encountering Strauss, Liu did not
think that traditional Chinese thought was capable of finding the Absolute Truth, and he
planed to employ Christian theology to rectify Chinese culture. After reading Strauss,
78 Liu Xiaofeng, “Shitelaosi yu wogelin”施特劳斯与沃格林 (“Strauss and Voegelin”), Jianjin Hanzhi, 262-63.
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however, he discovered that there was a parallel tension between philosophy and the
city in Chinese history. By emphasizing the importance of social nomos, Liu also changed
his attitude toward the Chinese tradition. In “Strauss in China” where he explained the
significance of translating Strauss, he stated that Strauss could teach the Chinese
intellectuals to cherish their own tradition, and this new evaluation of the Chinese
tradition would lead the Chinese people to retrieve their own “ethical identity” which
has been lost for over a century during modernization. The meeting between Strauss
and China, and more generally, between classical Western and Chinese philosophy, is
essentially a “meeting between classical mentalities.”79
However, there is a project that Liu has yet undertaken. If he really takes value
absolutism seriously, then, after rediscovering the “ritual-law” tradition as the moral
basis of Chinese people, he still needs to find a common basis for a universal morality.
This basis may be discovered through a dialogue between the revelational religions and
the Confucian “ritual-law” system. However, Liu may not be interested in this task, both
because he keeps emphasizing the philosopher’s (and his own) detachment from the
ethical-political realm, and because according to Strauss, “no one can be both a
philosopher and a theologian.”80
79 Liu Xiaofeng, “Shitelaosi yu zhongguo”施特劳斯与中国 (“Strauss in China: the Meeting of Classical
Mentalities”), Shitelaosi de lubiao, 354-55.
80 Leo Strauss, “Progress or Return?” RCPR, 270.
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4. Gan Yang and Leo Strauss
As have been shown, Leo Strauss changed Liu Xiaofeng’s attitude toward the
Chinese political and philosophical tradition. Analogously, Gan Yang experienced a
similar transformation. As a friend and intellectual comrade of Liu, Gan’s personal
experience was similar to Liu’s in many respects. He was born in 1952 at Shenyang and
raised in Hangzhou, a tranquil southern city with beautiful scenery. During the Cultural
Revolution, he was first a Red Guard of Maoism but then started to question the
justification of this movement. In 1970, he was assigned to labor in the rural area of
Greater Khingan Mountains, a wild, remote and gelid forest area near Russian Siberia.
After the death of Mao, Gan was admitted by Heilongjiang University and gained his
bachelor’s degree in 1982. Then he entered Peking University and studied Western
philosophy together with Liu. During graduate studies, he developed an interest in
continental philosophy, especially Heidegger and Neo-Kantianism. After graduation in
1985, Gan became the editor-in-chief of the aforementioned “Culture: China and the
World” book series. Those books introducing the Western academy attracted many
young students, and as a result, Gan became an intellectual leader during the 1980s. In
1989, he left China and became a PhD candidate in The Committee of Social Thought at
University of Chicago where he studied with Edward Shiles, Allen Bloom and François
Furet. Ten years later, he left Chicago without a PhD degree. After serving in a series of
positions in Hong Kong and Mainland China, in 2009, he eventually became the dean of
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the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities at Sun Yat-sen University in Canton,
where he implemented a Straussian liberal education program.
Compared to Liu, a sophisticated theologian (then a philosopher) who was famous
for writing lengthy books, Gan was a more straightforward scholar who never wrote
books but gained his prestige from incisive essays. In 1985 and 1986, he clearly asserted
that contemporary China had to respond to the challenge of the global modernization.
As the most advanced “pre-modern culture,” China’s modernization must be hard and
full of disharmony.81 He harshly criticized the doctrines held by some Confucians that
China must preserve its own value and even redeem Western rationalism. From his
perspective, as culture was always changing and reforming, there was no so-called
“abstract Chinese culture” or “abstract Western culture.”82 If Japan, a former Confucian
country sharing the same culture with China for thousands of years, was capable of
modernizing its own culture, then according to Gan, there was no valid reason for China
to rigidly preserve its own traditional values. In order to defend his stance, Gan
employed the Heideggerian concept Zeitlichkeit (temporality) to argue that tradition was
not a metaphysical substance, but a ceaseless flowing process from the past to the
future.83
81 Gan Yang, “Bashi niandai zhongguo wenhua taolun wuti (1985)”八十年代中國文化討論五題 (“Five
Topics on Chinese Culture in the 1980s (1985)”), Gujin zhongxi zhizheng古今中西之爭 (Quarrels between the
Ancients and the Moderns, the Chinese and the Western), Beijing, SDX Press, 2006, 28.
82 Gan Yang, “Gujin zhongxi zhizheng (1985)”古今中西之爭 (“Quarrels between the Ancients and the
Moderns, the Chinese and the Western (1985)”), Gujin zhongxi zhizheng, 36.
83 Ibid, 48.
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It is clear that, at that time, Gan had a firmly optimistic faith in modernity. He was
the successor of the Enlightenment tradition, and believed that China should learn from
the advanced West in order to develop science and rationality. In 1987, however,
because of his encounter with the thought of Ernst Cassirer, his attitude toward
traditional Chinese culture experienced a subtle change. In the preface to Cassirer’s
Language and Myth (Chinese translation, 1988), Gan showed the readers that though
reason was the dominant feature of Western culture, some philosophers had realized
that reason had its own limitations and its legitimacy was questionable. Cassirer argued
that scientific reason should not despise the importance of pre-rational cultural elements
such as myth and ritual because these phenomena also had conceptual forms and
structures which could be grasped by human reason.84 Gan was inspired by this novel
idea. At the end of the preface, he reminded the readers that “Traditional Chinese
culture is precisely an illogical and ungrammatical culture.” For Chinese, which lacked
articles as well as gender and tense markers, it was much easier than in the Indo-
European languages to break the fetters of logic. “The interesting thing is that while
modern Chinese intellectuals are trying to overcome the illogical character of Chinese
culture, continental European intellectuals are regarding logic and strict grammar as
fetters and trying to overcome these deficiencies.”85
Influenced by Cassirer, Gan began to be nostalgic for the Chinese tradition.
84 Gan Yang, “Cong lixing de pipan dao wenhua de pipan”從“理性的批判”到“文化的批判” (“From the
Critique of Reason to the Critique of Culture”), Gujin zhongxi zhizheng, 70-73.
85 Ibid, 91-92.
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Simultaneously, his attitude toward modernity became equally ambivalent because he
had become aware of the unacceptably negative aspects of modernity, such as
mammonism and mass culture. He started to take the claim of cultural conservatism
seriously and stated that the value of Confucianism in contemporary China was not to
conform to modernization, but to compensate, to reconcile, and to counterbalance
modernity.86 Chinese intellectuals, according to his acute observation, had an
unavoidable fate to fight a “two-front war:”87 as members of society, intellectuals had
the responsibility to unconditionally support the “providence” of modern
“disenchantment” and to facilitate the “instrumental reason,” yet as “civilized
intellectuals,” they must feel sorrowful about and should fight against the withering of
nobility and valuable cultural elements during modernization.88
In order to solve this contradiction, Gan borrowed Berlin’s concept of negative and
positive liberty to show that his pursuit of higher culture (he classified this as “positive”
liberty) stemmed from his personal interest which would exercise no coercive
influence.89 In 1989, in partnership with Liu and other intellectuals, Gan supported the
liberal democratic movement on the Tian’anmen Square. But the political coercion in
June of 1989 worsened the situation and Gan had to leave his motherland. It might be a
86 Gan Yang, “Ruxue yu xiandai (1988)”儒學與現代 (“Confucianism and Modern: also Concerning
Confucianism and Modern China (1988)”), Gujin zhongxi zhizheng, 113-23.
87 Gan Yang, “Zhongguo dangdai wenhua yishi qianyan (1988)” 《中國當代文化意識》前言 (“Preface to The
Cultural Consciousness of Contemporary China (1988)”), Gujin zhongxi zhizheng, 106-09.
88 Gan Yang, “Ruxue yu xiandai” (“Confucianism and Modern”), 135.
89 Gan Yang & Zha Jianying (查建英), “Yu Zha Jianying tan bashi niandai”與查建英談八十年代 (“Discussing
the 1980s with Gan Yang”), Gujin zhongxi zhizheng, 220-21.
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misfortune that he was marginalized during the 1990s in Mainland China, but his
academic experience at The University of Chicago was profound. He was attracted by
the conservative thinkers and their criticisms of liberalism and he was able to have
conversations with the greatest American intellectuals face to face. It was here that he
met Allen Bloom, the preeminent disciple of Leo Strauss and became a Straussian.
The publication in 2003 of the Chinese preface of Natural Right and History was a
sign that Gan was back in the intellectual circle of Mainland China. Many observers
have pointed out that Gan’s interpretation of Strauss is different from that of Liu, so they
treat Gan as the second source of Chinese Straussianism rather than as a follower of Liu.
(Actually Gan’s encounter with Strauss was more direct because he was a student of
Bloom but Liu was not a student or friend of Meier before reading his papers.) Though a
preface to a single book of Strauss, this article is a long and comprehensive introduction
of Strauss’s thought. As Natural Right and History is the most famous expression of
Strauss’s theory on the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns, Gan started his
introduction with this topic. He correctly recognized that the ancient political
philosophers -- Socrates, Plato and Aristotle -- tried their best to find the natural basis of
right and wrong, good and bad, noble and base. They believed that there was a “natural
right” that could and should be discovered by human reason. However, from the birth
of modern “natural rights” theory, modern political philosophers gradually abandoned
the pursuit of absolute values, and after three waves of modernity, Weberian relativism
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and Heideggerian historicism now dominated the intellectual world, which Strauss
characterized as “nihilism.” Modern social scientists believed that human beings could
only have consensus on issues of fact, and that it was beyond the capacity of science to
discuss issues of value. Correspondingly, modern political philosophers believed that
the criteria of good and bad varied from time to time, from nation to nation, and that
there could not be naturally valid common values. In order to resist nihilism, according
to Gan and Strauss, a return to ancient political philosophy is a great necessity.90
After dealing with this quarrel, in the next two parts, Gan put Strauss into the
American political context and contemporary Western intellectual debates. Here we can
see an important difference between Liu and Gan: while Liu repeatedly asserted his
“retreat from politics” and emphasized Strauss’s academic life, Gan was interested in the
relationship between the Straussians and the American ideological debates. He classified
Strauss’s political thought as a kind of political and cultural conservatism. However,
different from Shadia Drury, Gan thought that this Straussian conservatism was not a
bad thing. He also compared Strauss with the Cambridge School, Kojeve, Arendt, and
Rawls, and paid special attention to Bloom’s critique of “the closing of the American
mind” and the responses from Rorty and Nussbaum. In addition, Gan interpreted
Strauss’s thought as a criticism both of liberalism and of all postmodern schools because
none of them put virtue higher than freedom and by so doing tended to be nihilistic.
90 Gan Yang, “Zhengzhi zheren shitelaosi”政治哲人施特勞斯 (“Strauss as a Political Philosopher: the
Revival of the Classical Conservative Political Philosophy”), Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chinese
Version), ii-xx..
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Therefore, Strauss is a valuable balance of the mainstream Rawlsian liberalism and the
popular postmodern radicalism.91
Until now Gan’s introduction of Strauss did not deviate from Strauss’s original
thought. However, when Gan touched the relationship between the Straussian
philosopher and the political society, his interpretation began to be different from both
Liu and Strauss. In this part, Gan followed Strauss’s thought in “What is Political
Philosophy?” and argued that the meaning of “political philosophy” was not only the
philosophical reflection on the political issues but also the relationship between politics
and philosophy. Therefore, political philosophy is a kind of “sociology of philosophy”
because it concerns the situation of the philosopher among the multitude.92 Gan then
pointed out that the quarrel between the ancients and moderns was actually a quarrel
between different views of the relationship between philosophy and politics. The
development of modern philosophy was a process of “philosophy gone mad,” which
meant that philosophers constantly attempted to remake the political world in accord
with their abstract philosophical imaginations.93 The result of this madness is the
“politicization of philosophy” and the “philosophization of politics” -- politics has to
found its basis on philosophical doctrines and isms, and philosophy transforms itself
from a private “loving of wisdom” to a weapon and instrument of public politics.
91 Ibid, xx-lvii.
92 Ibid, lvii-lviii.
93 Ibid, lxiii-lxiv.
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However, this is in fact the dual distortion of both philosophy and politics.94
As Gan interpreted, in order to cure this modern disease, Strauss emphasized the
importance of the “Socratic problem,” and led us to reflect on the origin of “political
philosophy.” “The very starting point of Strauss’s whole political philosophy can be
regarded as an attempt to find a way out to restrain the madness of philosophy in order to
avoid the madness of politics.”95 He then further made a definite statement that “the
origin of classical political philosophy was precisely for the restriction of philosophy’s
madness and for the maintenance of a stable political society.”96 Therefore, it seems that
Gan treated philosophy and political philosophy as totally different things, as if
philosophy was madness, and political philosophy was medicine -- the essence and
function of philosophy and political philosophy were opposing. In addition, he also
implied that political philosophy was a defender of the political society and that it
shared the same nature with social conventions.
However, it must be said that Gan’s definition of political philosophy
misrepresented Strauss’s original meaning. It is right that Socrates was the first man
who brought philosophy from the heaven down to the earth and it is also right that
Socrates was the inventor of political philosophy, but it is wrong to say that the nature of
political philosophy was entirely different from philosophy. Actually, at the very
beginning of the fourth chapter of Natural Right and History, Strauss had criticized an
94 Ibid, lix-lx.
95 Ibid, lx.
96 Ibid, lx.
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opinion similar to Gan’s.
[T]he modern reader almost inevitably arrives at the following view: Socrates
turned away from the study of nature and limited his investigations to human
things. Being unconcerned with nature, he refused to look at human things in the
light of the subversive distinction between nature and law (convention). He rather
identified law with nature. He certainly identified the just with the legal. He thus
restored the ancestral morality, although in the element of reflection.
However, Strauss clearly criticized this view by saying that “[t]his view mistakes
Socrates’ ambiguous starting point or the ambiguous result of his inquiries for the
substance of his thought. To mention for the moment only one point, the distinction
between nature and law (convention) retains its full significance for Socrates and for
classical natural right in general.”97 Therefore, the change from (natural) philosophy to
political philosophy was in fact merely a change of the object (or theme) of investigation.
Strauss then further demonstrated that philosophy and political philosophy actually
used the same methodology. Socrates’s
study of human things consisted in raising the question “What is?”... But it was
not limited to raising the question “What is?” in regard to specific human things,
such as the various virtues. Socrates was forced to raise the question as to what the
human things as such are, or what the ratio rerum humanarum is... Like every other
97 Leo Strauss, NRH, 120-21.
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philosopher, he identified wisdom, or the goal of philosophy, with the science of all
the beings: he never ceased considering “what each of the beings is.”98
Actually, in Strauss’s point of view, political philosophy was based on the
assumption that the political world was also natural and could be investigated by
philosophic methodology. This is why Socrates believed that the nature or essence of
virtues could appear through his dialectics99. Therefore, political philosophy is as
dangerous as philosophy and even more dangerous than philosophy, because while the
former does not care about the human society, the latter directly questions the
legitimacy of all established social authorities. In comparison, Gan’s definition of
political philosophy as a medicine of philosophy misunderstood Strauss’s thought. In
fact, Gan mistakenly identified political philosophy with a special art of writing.
Interestingly, Gan then said that “ancient political philosophy... did not change
philosophy’s character, but changed philosophy’s way of expression... The political
philosopher had the same intellectual madness as the philosopher, but he became very
cautious on his expression and especially his writing.”100 It is at here that he introduced
the distinction between exoteric and esoteric teachings. Thereby, Gan clarified his
previous statements and returned to the correct understanding of Strauss.
However, the more interesting thing is that at the end of this part, Gan made a final
statement that “Strauss emphasized that the exoteric teaching was precisely political
98 Leo Strauss, NRH, 121-22.
99 Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsy ed, HPP, 3-4.
100 Gan Yang, “Zhengzhi zheren shitelaosi” (“Strauss as a Political Philosopher”), lxi-lxii.
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philosophy.”101 We are not sure whether this statement means that “exoteric teaching is
equivalent to political philosophy” or that “exoteric teaching is the essence of political
philosophy,” but actually neither of those possibilities are correct understanding.
Exoteric teaching is the qualified endorsement of the social conventions regulated by
laws originated from the authority of religions. Its content is closer to theology than to
pure philosophy because the philosopher himself has to pretend to be a pious man. Hence,
it seems that Gan was overly concerned about the social function of political philosophy
and the stability of the political society.
Actually he was. We have seen that Gan almost equated political philosophy with
the art of writing. Then, what was his attitude toward the issue of persecution?
Interestingly, Gan nowhere touched the philosopher’s being persecuted by the
unphilosophic multitude, but repeatedly emphasized the multitude’s being persecuted
by the philosopher. He also quoted Strauss’s original texts to support his interpretation:
“Philosophy is the attempt to replace opinion by knowledge; but opinion is the element
of the city, hence philosophy is subversive, hence the philosopher must write in such a
way that he will improve rather than subvert the city.”102 As has been said, Gan
regarded philosophy as a disease of the political society which must be controlled.
Therefore, the application of the art of writing is for the protection of the political society
101 Ibid, lxxix. Gan made a footnote at here and showed that his paraphrase came from Strauss’s Persecution
and the Art of Writing. However, he gave the pages ranging from 7 to 37, and did not pointed out where
Strauss said the similar words.
102 Leo Strauss, “A Giving of Accounts.”JPCM, 463.
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rather than for the philosopher per se.103
Gan’s interpretation was partial but not incorrect. The persecution conceived by
Strauss is actually a mutual persecution: the mania of the philosopher “persecuted” the
society, and in turn the society persecuted the philosopher and killed Socrates. However,
just as a Chinese scholar had pointed out, Gan nowhere mentioned the death of Socrates,
as if this famous historical fact had never taken place.104 In contrast, Liu’s interpretation
of the persecution was more comprehensive because he emphasized this mutual
persecution. The protection of the philosophic activity and contemplative life was,
according to Liu, of equal importance as the protection of the political life and social
conventions.
Even if Gan’s interpretation was not wrong, it does not mean that the protection of
the political society was the starting point and ultimate concern of Strauss’s intellectual
investigation. Unlike Liu, Gan did not directly quote anything from Strauss’s
“Persecution and the Art of Writing,”105 the first hand document exhaustively exhibited
Strauss’s idea on persecution. At the beginning of the article, Strauss mentioned nothing
about society’s being persecuted by the philosopher. Having the totalitarian rule of
Hitler in mind, he was concerned about how a political dissident or a free thinker could
survive in the face of strict censorship. If this dissident does not want to be killed, but
103 Gan Yang, “Zhengzhi zheren shitelaosi” (“Strauss as a Political Philosopher”), lxiii.
104 Shui Yidi (水亦棣), “Zhengzhi yu zhexue”政治與哲學 (“Politics and Philosophy: Two Interpretations of
Leo Strauss by Gan Yang and Liu Xiaofeng”), Open Time開放時代, 03 (2004), 60.
105 “Persecution and the Art of Writing” is both the name of an article and of a book. At this place we are
focusing on the article.
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also wants to express the truths he has discovered, he can “utter them in print without
incurring any danger, provided he is capable of writing between the lines.”106 He can
write in a loquacious way, endorse the dominating ideology, and intentionally leave
some contradictions which cannot be detected by the mediocrity but can attract the
really smart readers. Strauss then argued that the persecution of free inquiry existed in
almost every society in the past but took different forms.107 Therefore, every philosopher
in Western intellectual history faced the danger of being persecuted. However, unlike
the modern philosophers who believed that persecution must be eradicated and the
entire human beings should be liberated, the ancient philosopher confirmed that “the
gulf separating ‘the wise’ and ‘the vulgar’ was a basic fact of human nature which could
not be influenced by any progress of popular education.”108 Strauss concluded that
“Exoteric literature presupposes that there are basic truths which would not be
pronounced in public by any decent man, because they would do harm to many people
who, having been hurt, would naturally be inclined to hurt in turn him who pronounces
the unpleasant truths.”109 Hence, it is only at the end of the article that Strauss referred to
the “mutual persecution,” but it does not mean that the philosopher’s “egoist self-
protection” is not the ultimate reason why he creates the exoteric writing.
In comparison, Gan portrayed a purely altruistic image of the Straussian
106 Leo Strauss, “Persecution and the Art of Writing,” PAW, 23.
107 Ibid, 32-33.
108 Ibid, 34.
109 Ibid, 36.
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philosopher. Forgetting the death punishment, Gan’s Socrates became a noble citizen
who controlled himself in order to save his city and his fellows. Gan then claimed that,
“Though the Straussian political philosophy underlines the conflict between philosophy
and politics, it does not intend to escape politics and step to philosophy. In opposition,
the chief issue of Straussian political philosophy is to return to the political world.”110
This statement makes him different from Liu who stressed the “retreat from politics” of
the Straussian philosopher. By leading the readers back to the original political world,
Gan further introduced Strauss’s theory of the “closed society” in opposition to Kojeve’s
“universal and homogeneous state.”111 According to Gan, Strauss identified “political
society” with particular societies, such as Athens, Rome, the United States and China,
each with its own particular conventions:
[E]very political society that ever has been or ever will be rests on a particular
fundamental opinion which cannot be replaced by knowledge and hence is of
necessity a particular or particularist society. This state of things imposes duties on
the philosopher’s public speech or writing which would not be duties if a rational
society were actual or emerging; it thus gives rise to a specific art of writing.112
Again, this art of writing interpreted by Gan was more a protection for the
particularistic society than for the philosopher himself.
Ultimately, Gan argued that what distinguished the thought of Strauss was not his
110 Gan Yang, “Zhengzhi zheren shitelaosi,” p. lxix.
111 Leo Strauss, OT, 236-39, 243-44.
112 Leo Strauss, “Preface,” LAM, viii.
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claim that philosophy was beyond politics or that the enlightenment of the multitude
was an illusion, but his insight into “the Socrates who defended justice and piety.” Gan
did not mention that the philosopher was actually the most self-sufficient man who
lived on the margin of the political community and only had a minimum attachment
with his fellow citizens.113 He intentionally diluted the aspect of the philosopher’s
detachment from politics and portrayed him as an active political actor. For Gan, the
social role of the Straussian philosopher is more important. Therefore, Gan interpreted
Strauss’s political philosophy as a defense of the active, political life rather than the
contemplative, philosophic life. In the face of the tension between the philosopher the
political society, Gan chose to be on the side of the latter. By so interpreting, Strauss even
became a defender of political particularism.
If, according to Gan, every “closed society” has the right to preserve its special
conventions against the claim of philosophical examination, then we can legitimately ask:
Does China, one of the closed societies Gan mentions, have the right to preserve its
traditional social conventions? According to Gan, the answer is yes. Xie Maosong, a
friend of Gan, reports that Gan did borrow particularism from Leo Strauss. After
accepting Strauss’s intellectual influence, Gan was no longer a partisan of the
“openness” of modern society. In his opinion, “opening up,” the fundamental policy of
contemporary China, should not merely mean participating in the capitalist world order
113 Leo Strauss, “Restatement on Xenophone’s Hiero,”WPP, 119-20. “Liberal Education and Responsibility,”
LAM, 13-15.
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without reflection, but rather that Chinese intellectuals should be open to the counter-
modernity theories among the Western philosophical circles -- such as Leo Strauss.114 He
did not thoroughly reject modernization, but he did reject the common opinion that
modernization equaled Westernization.115 Distinct from his claims in the 1980s, he now
increasingly emphasized the “Chinese character” rather than the common character of
modernity.
In an interview in 2003, Gan worried that Chinese intellectuals still believed that the
Chinese tradition was a great barrier to modernization. In Gan’s understanding, the
central task for China to undertake in the twenty-first century was a revival of its
traditional “national character” rather than an acceptance of a Westernized way of life.
Losing a “national character,” he argued, was terrible. In this interview, Gan harshly
criticized Turkish Kemalism because the latter was precisely a representative of the
“self-castrating modernization,” i.e., modernization that did not preserve the traditional
Turkish culture. The result was that Turkish people had lost their “national identity”
and had become a third-rate country under the shadow of Western civilization. In order
to avoid this fate, the “Chinese people must realize that traditional Chinese civilization
is the most important resource for the development of modern China. Whether China
114 Xie Maosong (謝茂松), “Cong zhexue dao zhengzhi (1)”從哲學到政治 (“From Philosophy to Politics (I):
The Debate about ‘the Ancients and Moderns, the Chinese and the Western’ and Political Maturity”), History
of Political Thought政治思想史, March 2011, 72.
115 Gan Yang, “Cong minzu guojia zouxiang wenming guojia”從“民族-國家”走向“文明-國家” (“From
‘Nation-State’ to ‘Civilization-State’”), 21st Century Economic Report二十一世紀經濟報道, December 29, 2003,
Page 1.
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will be successful in the twenty-first century is to a great degree dependent on whether
Chinese people are capable of consciously putting modern China into the river of its
traditional civilization.”116 As can be seen, Gan had abandoned his more Westernized
early thoughts and preferred traditional China to Western modernization doctrines. Like
“the Socrates who defended justice and piety,” Gan tried his best to defend the
traditional Chinese way of life in order to resist the “persecution” of the manic modern
intellectuals who attempted to replace the Chinese character with universal
modernization.
During the 1980s, Gan was the editor-in-chief of the book series: “Culture: China
and the World.” In 2007, after becoming a Straussian and a promoter of traditional
Chinese culture, Gan created a new series: “Culture: China and the World (New
Series),” publishing books that gave preference to the “Chinese character.” In the preface
to the series, he told the readers that the purpose of his present task was “reconsidering
China, reconsidering the West, reconsidering the Ancient and reconsidering the
Modern.”117 According to Gan, a powerful yet questionable fashion of the Chinese
academy was to follow Western academic fashion. This fashion though means a spiritual
subjection to the dominance of the West. Hence, Gan appealed to the emergence of a
mature and independent Chinese academy. “The sign of the maturity of Chinese
thought, academy and culture can be found in the formation of an independent stance
116 Ibid.
117 Gan Yang, Tong san tong通三統 (Synthesizing Three Traditions), Beijing, SDX Press, 2007, iv.
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representing the autonomy of Chinese civilization. This stance can lead Chinese
intellectuals to study, analyze and judge various Western theories according to our own
perspectives. They will stop following the Western fashion.”118
Gan’s endorsement of cultural particularism was further expressed in his criticism
of West-centralism, i.e., the doctrine claiming that Western modernization is a universal
path for the whole world. Distinct from some Western liberals who asserted West-
centralism reflected the arrogance and prejudice of the West, Gan did not regard the
West-oriented perspective as absolutely a shortcoming. “There isn’t any mistake for the
Westerners to hold West-centralism. Otherwise should we ask them to hold Sino-
centralism?”119 What Gan found problematic is that Chinese intellectuals accept and
endorse West-centralism and use this pure Western perspective to judge China.
Therefore, if it is legitimate for the Westerners to hold West-centralism, it is also
legitimate for the Chinese to develop a symmetrical Sino-centralism.
In 2006, cooperating with Liu, Gan created a book series named “The Source and
Course of the Western Academy.” In the co-authored preface to the series, “Re-reading
the West,” Gan and Liu asked the Chinese intellectuals to cultivate a “healthy reading
attitude” toward the West. Why healthy? Gan and Liu argued, not exaggeratedly
speaking, that there was a “morbid psychology” among Chinese intellectuals when
reading Western thought: they regarded China as the “nidus,” and the West as the
118 Ibid, p. vi.
119 Gan Yang, “Chongxin renshi zhongguo”重新認識中國 (“Reconsidering China”), Tong San Tong, 19.
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“pharmacy.” Their aim was to collect prescriptions which could cure Chinese diseases,
and to import “truth” from the West with which to criticize the Chinese “fault”. This
kind of “morbid attitude” created morbid Chinese intellectuals, and then created various
morbid opinions and thoughts, which, on the one side, flattered Western academy as a
catholicon, and on the other side, devalued and distorted Chinese civilization as a
demon. This morbid reading habit was one of the real niduses of modern China.120 In
contrast, a “healthy reading attitude” will radically reject the certainty that the Western
academy can provide any ultimate solutions for Chinese problems. Instead, it will pay
attention to how Westerners resolve their own problems.121 A “healthy reading attitude”
will also be skeptical about the Western thoughts and institutions, and be especially
vigilant about the fads among Western academicians, because healthy Chinese readers
have adequate reasons to believe that the Western academy is retrogressing: the
frequent appearance of new terminologies, new doctrines and new “isms” can reflect
nothing but the intellectual “bubblization.”122 Though Gan and Liu did not directly
mention Leo Strauss and the revival of ancient philosophy in this preface, it is not
difficult to see that Strauss himself, or at least their idea of him, is standing behind them.
So far we can see that Gan and Liu share a similar intellectual trajectory. In the 1980s,
both of them did not believe the legitimacy of Chinese tradition in the modern world.
120 Gan Yang & Liu Xiaofeng, “Zongxu: chongxin yuedu xifang”總序：重新閱讀西方 (“General Preface: Re-
reading the West”), Karl Loewith, From Hegel to Nietzsche (Chinese Version), Beijing, SDX Press, 2006, i.
121 Ibid, ii.
122 Ibid, ii.
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Both of them argued from different perspectives that China should absorb Western
culture in order to transform its own culture. In the 1990s, both of them accepted new
ideas from the West. Finally, during the first decade of the twenty-first century, both of
them became Straussians and promoted the special value of Chinese culture. Specifically,
the most important similarity between them is their common attitude toward modernity,
whether before or after encountering Strauss. In the early years, both of them regarded
modernity and modernization as “fact” and “necessary tendency” which could not be
altered by personal choices or value preferences. However, after encountering Strauss,
as Strauss criticized the separation between fact and value and the Hegelian conception
of history as a dialectical progress, they became more confident that it was dependent on
their choice whether Chinese should or should not accept modernization.
Besides those similarities, they also applied Strauss’s thought in different ways.
Since Liu stressed the philosopher’s detachment from politics, he himself as a model
retreated from the public discussion and attempted to follow Strauss in order to advance
a new understanding of the Chinese intellectual history. He was also more concerned
about the cultivation of his and his followers’ “classical mentalities.” In contrast, since
Gan emphasized philosopher’s role of defending the particular political society, he,
identified himself as a conservative, liked to step into the political sphere and participate
the ideological debates in China. We will analyze their political stances in the next
chapter.
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5. The Political Implications of Chinese Straussians
Leo Strauss continually attracts more and more students and young scholars in
Mainland China. However, unlike in the United States, Chinese Straussians have not
become members of the government, nor have they given any practical political advice.
But as “political philosophers,” they inevitably hold political stances, even though they
repeatedly stress their interests in great books and claim that “the only political stance
of Strauss is to be cautious on your own political stance.”123
5.1 Are Chinese Straussians Nationalists?
As Chinese Straussians, especially Liu and Gan, claim that there should be a revival
of ancient Chinese thought, we have to ask: are they cultural or political nationalists?
Actually, “there has not been a unified Straussian school in China.”124 Therefore, we
have to analyze their political stances one by one. I will argue that they are not typical
nationalists, but all share nationalist tendency in different degrees.
Xu Jian (徐戩), a graduate student in philosophy at Die Universitaet Frankfurt and a
Chinese Straussian, is a moderate scholar who articulated his anti-nationalist stance by
developing Strauss’s thoughts in “German nihilism.” As Strauss said,
If nihilism is the rejection of the principles of civilization as such, and if
123 Han Chao (韓潮), “Tianren zhiji, gujin zhibian, zhongxi zhihui,”天人之際·古今之變·中西之會 (“The
Meeting between the Heaven and the Human, the Change from the Ancient to the Modern, the Encounter
between the East and the West: the Significance of Strauss’s Coming from the West”), Xu Jian ed, Gujin
zhizheng yu wenming zijue (Quarrels between the Ancients and the Moderns and the Self-consciousness of a
Civilization: Leo Strauss in the Chinese Context), 282.
124 Xu Jian,“Gaogui de jingsai”高貴的競賽 (“A Noble Competition”), Gujin zhizheng yu wenming zijue, 7-9.
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civilization is based on recognition of the fact that the subject of civilization is man
as man, every interpretation of science and morals in terms of races, or of nations, or
of cultures, is strictly speaking nihilistic... The nationalist interpretation of science or
philosophy implies that we cannot really learn anything worthwhile from people
who do not belongs to our nation or our culture.125
Strauss also made a distinction between civilization and culture. Every people,
whether civilized or barbarous, has its particular culture, but on the contrary,
civilization provides a universal moral standard.126 Following this distinction, Xu argues,
even if we should cherish our own tradition, China should identify itself as a civilization
rather than a culture. For this reason, he further argues that modern intellectuals should
not blindly criticize Enlightenment universalism, because this criticism may lead to even
worse relativism. Hence he implies that China should participate in the dialogue
between different peoples and advance its own conception of the world order as a
“harmony but not sameness” (和而不同 ), as a qualified diversity based on common
principles, and as a world promoting the virtue of moderation.127 Those conceptions are
supported by ancient Chinese thinkers, and are consistent with Strauss’s idea of “the
unity of oneness and variety,”128 that each closed society may partly open itself in order
125 Leo Strauss, GN, Interpretation, 26 (1999), 366.
126 Ibid, 365.
127 Xu Jian, “Gaogui de jingsai” (“A Noble Competition”), Gujin zhizheng yu wenming zijue, 7-9.
128 Leo Strauss, “Liberal Education and Responsibility,” LAM, 24.
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to learn from other societies.129
Liu Xiaofeng, the intellectual companion of Xu, generally agrees with this stance.
However, unlike Xu who shows a minimum sympathy toward modern Enlightenment,
Liu nowhere expresses any positive support for universal Enlightenment values, such us
individual liberty, democracy and human rights. He strictly complies with Strauss’s
distinction between the ancients and the moderns, and regards the modern values as
nihilistic.
In an essay published in 2005, Liu even mocked Chinese liberals in a very satirical
tone. He pointed out that “individual rights” as a modern value were incompatible with
the Chinese tradition which emphasized the superiority of family over individual. He
declared that he was the defender of this tradition, because by promoting the family
ethics, modern Chinese people will live a better life; moreover, family ethics can also
help China maintain a large population, which will exercise political pressure upon
contemporary world politics. On the contrary, if Chinese people change its traditional
conventions and become modern individualists, family ethics will collapse, and Chinese
race might also be extinct.130 Therefore, Liu concluded, the spread of liberalism in China
129 Also see Susan Shell, “To Spare the Vanquished and Crush the Arrogant,” Cambridge Companion to Leo
Strauss, 187-88.
130 It is very hard to understand why the collapse of family ethics will lead to the extinction of Chinese race.
Liu did not give us a reasonable logic on this statement. However, in modern Chinese history, there was a
constant fear among Chinese leaders that Chinese race might be gradually extinct in the face of Western
imperialism. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of Republic of China, was afraid that Chinese people might be
incapable of resisting Western and Japanese imperialism in the long run because the growth rate of Chinese
population, according to his view, was much lower than imperialist countries. Like Liu, Sun also claimed
that in order to get rid of Western imperialism, China should admire its own tradition, especially family
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might be a Western “conspiracy,” an “apocalyptic conspiracy.”131 The intellectuals
promoting modern “universal values” would stain national history. In “Strauss and
China,” Liu even stressed that the spread of Strauss and ancient political philosophy
would revive traditional Chinese morality and overthrow the “political superiority” of
modern “universal values.”132 Those words have a strong Schmittian color.
Liu’s defense of the Chinese tradition is strongly connected with his rejection of
modernity. Therefore, if we try to understand Liu as the way he understands himself,
we may not conclude in haste that Liu is a nationalist because the mainstream theories
generally regard nationalism as a modern phenomenon. In addition, Liu also does not
believe that Chinese culture is the best and that we Chinese need not to learn anything
else from other cultures. Liu frequently claims that in order to understand modern
China, people must first understand the West.133 He is also an imitator of the philosophic
spirit of Plato, Maimonides, Al-Farabi and Strauss. In the Chinese context, he calls for a
simultaneous return to both the ancient Chinese and ancient Western traditions.134 Using
ethics. Mao also argued that only by increasing the population could China resist American imperialism.
This is why during his rule, such a great amount of population was produced and why during Deng’s
period, China must control its population and implement the notorious “one-child policy.” Interestingly,
however, Mao’s promotion of increasing the Chinese population was in companion with an unprecedented
assault of traditional family ethics. He used the theoretical weapon of “class analysis” to destroy all kinds of
provincial family identity.
131 Liu Xiaofeng, “Zhishi fenzi de maobu (2000)”知識份子的貓步 (“Intellectuals’ Cat Walk (2000)”), accessed
March 19, http://reading.cersp.com/DeepRead/Learning/200511/87.html.
132 Liu Xiaofeng, “Shitelaosi yu zhongguo”施特勞斯與中國 (“Strauss and China: the Meeting of Classical
Mentalities”), Intellectual Battlefront思想戰線, 35 (2009), 65.
133 Liu Xiaofeng, “Yetan ershiyi shiji jingshen”也談“二十一世紀精神” (“On the Spirit of the Twenty-first
Century”), Zhe yidairen de pa he ai, 320.
134 After encountering Strauss, he made a bibliography for students who wanted to cultivate their “classical
mentalities,” and listed Chinese classics, Greek-Roman classics, and even Biblical classics with Straussian
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an improper but illuminating analogy: Like Lenin’s idea of the worldwide communist
revolution (politically), Liu wants a worldwide Straussian reaction (intellectually), in
which the Chinese and the Westerners can respectively return to their ancient roots and
open a deep dialogue to share their common understanding of philosophy and politics,
like what has been shown in Chapter III.
Compared to Liu, Gan’s active defense of the particularist “closed society” makes
him more nationalistic. However, like Xu Jian, he also conceives of China as a
civilization. He then argues that the building of a “nation-state” is not a universal
tendency because nationalization is essentially a Western concept. In his opinion, China
should transform itself into a “civilization-state” in the twenty-first century and step out
of the parochial nationalism.135
However, Gan’s idea of “civilization” is different from Xu’s. Xu follows Strauss and
makes a distinction between civilization and culture, and clearly defines civilization as
universal and culture as particular. In comparison, Gan regards civilization and nation
as opposing concepts, but interestingly, he ambiguously defines civilization as “national
character,” a concept similar to Mill’s.136 This makes his stance more nationalistic. In his
interpretive secondary materials. [Liu Xiaofeng, “Gudian shumu sanshi zhong”古典書目三十種 (“A
Bibliography of Thirty Classics”), Chongqi gudian shixue重啟古典詩學 (Reviving the Ancient Poetics), Beijing,
Huaxia Press, 2010, pp. 307-319.] Cooperated with Leopold Leeb (雷立柏), an Austrian scholar in classical
studies teaching at Renmin University, Liu has settled a “Class of Classical Studies” and offered courses on
Greek, Latin and classical Chinese (文言文).
135 Gan Yang, “Cong minzu guojia zouxiang wenming guojia” (“From ‘Nation-State’ to ‘Civilization-State’”),
21st Century Economic Report, December 29, 2003, Page 1.
136 Ibid. Gan borrows his understanding of civilization from Levenson’s Confucian China and its Modern Fate,
but he does not clearly explain what Levenson means by civilization. In my personal understanding, Gan
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lectures on Chinese liberal education, Gan says that the Chinese universities must be
“firmly rooted in the deepest tradition of Chinese civilization”137 in order to cultivate
“cultural elites” who will be conscious that all Chinese people share a great and elegant
“common past.”138 Gan implies that his proposal is an imitation of the American
conservatives because the latter regards American liberal education not only as a spread
of knowledge but also as a consolidation of their own identity.139 By emphasizing the
Chinese national character, he even says that the Western Studies in China should be
directed by Chinese perspectives. For example, instead of merely regurgitating the
Western research, Chinese scholars should have the confidence that they can draw their
“own” conclusions about ancient Greece.140 This might be contrary to Strauss’s teaching,
because the latter persuaded us to understand someone as he/she understood
him/herself.
Among the active Straussians, Zhang Zhiyang141 is the most nationalistic. Zhang is
regards premodern China as a civilization because Chinese people regarded “all under the Heaven” as one
family. This is a quasi-cosmopolitan ideal. This definition of civilization is similar to Xu’s because it
emphasizes the universalistic dimension of civilization. However, he then says that Chinese civilization
equals to Chinese “national character” (國性, Guoxing, nationality, nation-ness), and then extensively
develops this idea and defends the Chinese tradition. But obviously, this concept is more particularistic.
137 Gan Yang, “Daxue de wenhua zhi gen”大學的文化之根 (“The Cultural Root of the University”), Tong San
Tong, 86.
138 Gan Yang, “Hafo xiaozhang yu hafo hongpishu,”哈佛校長與哈佛紅皮書 (“The Harvard President and
the Harvard Red Book”), Tong San Tong, 104.
139 Gan Yang, “Woguo daxue de tongshi jiaoyu zhilu”我國大學的通識教育之路 (“The Way of Liberal
Education in China”), 135-37.
140 Gan Yang, Liu Xiaofeng, Zhang Zhilin, He Ming, “Xifang gudianxue zai zhongguo”西方古典學在中國
(“Western Classical Studies in China (I)”), Open Time開放時代, 01 (2009), 9.
141 Zhang Zhiyang (張志揚) is Professor of Philosophy at Hainan University in Haikou, specializing in
German philosophy and political philosophy. He was persecuted in the Cultural Revolution. But in prison,
he learned German and German philosophy all by himself. Twelve years older than Liu, he was Liu’s
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an old friend of Liu and maintained a good relationship with Liu’s cultural Christian
circle in the late twentieth century, but now he is also influenced by Strauss’s critique of
modernity. In his article, he specifically calls upon his readers to remember the role of
Western imperialism in modern Chinese history, and argues strongly that Chinese
modernity is actually forcefully imposed by the West. Zhang then criticizes Westernized
Chinese intellectuals by saying that they forget this tragic history. He uses a metaphor to
emphasize their forgetfulness: The West as a powerful but ruthless man raped China as
a foreign woman and produced modern Chinese intellectuals as their child. But
ridiculously, after this crime, the woman belonged to this man, and the child even
regarded him as a benefactor. Therefore, Zhang argues that China should reject the
modern Western criterion and revitalize its own values in order to resist Western
assimilation.142 Zhang is the Straussian who most combines anti-modernity with anti-
imperialism. As anti-imperialism belongs to left-wing nationalism in the Leninist and
Maoist tradition, Zhang can be regarded as a nationalistic Straussian in the Chinese
context.
5.2 Are Chinese Straussians Liberal Democrats?
Chinese Straussians are not unqualified supporters of liberalism as a political theory
and liberal democracy as a political institution. This stance does not radically deviate
“spiritual instructor” in the 1980s. In the twenty-first century, Zhang was also influenced by Liu’s interest in
Strauss, and turned to focus on political philosophy.
142 Zhang Zhiyang, “zhongguoren wenti yu youtairen wenti” “中國人問題”與“猶太人問題” (The Chinese
Problem and the Jewish Problem), Zhongguoren wenti yu youtairen wenti “中國人問題”與“猶太人問題” (The
Chinese Problem and the Jewish Problem), Beijing, SDX Press, 2011, 2-5.
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from Strauss’s original intention. However, context plays a crucial role. As a Jewish
émigré persecuted by Nazi Germany and protected by the United States, Strauss
showed a “qualified embrace” of liberal democracy even though he criticized the moral
basis of liberalism.143 In addition, in order to appease the “Straussophobia”144 among the
American liberal circles, American Straussians145 have to defend their teacher by arguing
that Strauss is not as dangerous as Shadia Drury thinks, or that his political attitude is
more complicated than she thinks. Just as Catherine and Michael Zuckert have pointed
out, though Strauss thought that “America is modern” (proposition 1) and “modernity is
bad” (proposition 2), he also claimed that “America is good” (proposition 3).146
There is plenty of evidence demonstrating Strauss’s friendship with American
liberal democracy.147 The most famous statement is in “Liberal Education and
143 William Galston, “Leo Strauss’s Qualified Embrace of Liberal Democracy,” Cambridge Companion to Leo
Strauss, 193-214.
144 Peter Minowitz, Straussophobia: Defending Leo Strauss and Straussians against Shadia Drury and Other
Accusers. Lanham, Lexington Books, 2009.
145 By “American Straussians,” I mean those Straussian scholars in American (and also Canadian)
universities and colleges, such as those who wrote chapters of History of Political Philosophy, instead of those
who entered the federal government and promoted the Iraq War.
146 Catherine & Michael Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy & American Democracy.
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2006, 75-78.
147 Not all Straussians believe that Strauss had a sincere loyalty to America because one should not forget
that Strauss may use exoteric writing to prevent persecution. For example, Steven Smith argues that
Strauss’s statement on his loyalty to America in the beginning of his Natural Right and History and Thoughts
on Machiavellimight just be his masks. In contrast, he expressed his true intention through interpreting
Locke’s liberal theory as an aimless hedonism in NRH. As Strauss regarded Locke’s philosophy as the basis
of the American regime, Smith argues, his true attitude toward America was also negative. William Galston
disagrees with Smith’s conclusion, and argues that even if Smith is right, there are also many other ways to
demonstrate that Strauss had positive views of America. In this thesis, I will not arbitrate who of these two
Straussians is right. I just argue that, even if Smith’s analysis is true, at least Strauss consciously used masks
to endorse liberal democracy as an American nomos. In China, however, as China is not a liberal democracy,
Chinese Straussians do not need those masks to hide their criticisms of liberalism. For Smith’s argument, see
Steven Smith, “Strauss’s America,” Reading Leo Strauss: Politics, Philosophy, Judaism, Chicago, the University
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Responsibility,” where Strauss said,
We are not permitted to be flatterers of democracy precisely because we are
friends and allies of democracy. While we are not permitted to remain silent on the
dangers to which democracy exposes itself as well as human excellence, we cannot
forget the obvious fact that by giving freedom to all, democracy also gives freedom
to those who care for human excellence.148
Hence Strauss, as one of “those who care for human excellence,” clearly expressed
his appreciation to America as his second homeland. Furthermore, he even regarded
modern liberal democracy as an embodiment of premodern thoughts even though it was
a product of the first wave of modernity. “The theoretical crisis does not necessarily lead
to a practical crisis, for the superiority of liberal democracy to communism, Stalinist or
post-Stalinist, is obvious enough. And above all, liberal democracy... derives powerful
support from a way of thinking which cannot be called modern at all: the premodern
thought of our western tradition.”149 This premodern feature of liberal democracy can be
regarded as Aristotelian: “[M]odern democracy would have to be described with a view
to its intention from Aristotle’s point of view as a mixture of democracy and
aristocracy.”150
of Chicago Press, 2006, 156-183. For Galston’s response, see William Galston, “Leo Strauss’s Qualified
Embrace of Liberal Democracy,” Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss, 193-214.
148 Leo Strauss, “Liberal Education and Responsibility,” LAM, 24.
149 Leo Strauss, “Three Waves of Modernity,” Hilail Gildin ed. An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten
Essays by Leo Strauss, Detriot, Wayne State University Press, 1989, 98.
150 Leo Strauss, CM, 35.
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Not only the American constitution, but also the English regime accepts the ancient
heritage, especially “the prudence to conceive of the modern ideals as a reasonable
adaption of the old and eternal ideal of decency, of rule of law, and of that liberty which
is not license, to changed circumstances.” Therefore, “while the English originated the
modern ideal -- the pre-modern ideal, the classical ideal of humanity, was no where
better preserved than in Oxford and Cambridge.”151 In a letter to Karl Loewith, he was
also delighted to find that “A man like Churchill proves that the possibility of
megalopsychia exists today exactly as it did in the fifth century B.C.”152 Those are signs of
Strauss’s “Anglophilia.”153 Therefore, Strauss asserted that “Wisdom requires
unhesitating loyalty to a decent constitution, and even to the cause of
constitutionalism.”154 “Liberal or constitutional democracy comes closer to what the
classics demanded than any alternative that is viable in our age.”155
What we should pay special attention to is that although Strauss made a clear
distinction between ancient and modern and exhibited his preference of ancient to
modern, he still thought that liberal democracy or modern constitutionalism was
essentially a beneficial mixture of modern and premodern elements, and that a corrupt
philosophical basis might not necessarily lead to a failure in practice. This balanced and
moderate view toward liberal democracy made Strauss and Straussians “unhesitating”
151 Leo Strauss, GN, 372.
152 “Letter to Loewith, August 20, 1946,” CCM, 111.
153 Steven Smith, “Leo Strauss: The Outlines of the Life,” Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss, 22.
154 Leo Strauss, “Liberal Education and Responsibility,” LAM, 24.
155 Leo Strauss, “Restatement on Xenophon’s Hiero,” OT, 194.
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defenders of American constitution. In contrast, in China, liberal democracy is not an
established political institution, nor do the government leaders pursue it. Liberalism is
still an ideal among the liberal intellectuals who constantly encourage the government to
take political reforms. Because their unfriendly attitude toward the Communist Party,
their freedom of expression is not legally protected, and the Party is always searching
for potential supporters among the intellectual circles who can defend the non-liberal
policies of the government. In this context, the Chinese Straussians as critics of liberal
democracy are more reluctant to soften their uncompromising anti-liberal stances.
Chinese Straussians are wholehearted supporters of elitism. In order to cultivate
noble men, they are moved by Strauss’s thoughts on liberal education. For Strauss,
liberal education may actually cultivate two different types of man, one is philosophers
who tend to fly away from politics and enjoy a contemplative life, the other is noble
gentlemen who may play active role in the moral-political sphere.156 Ding Yun,157 one of
the earliest translators of Strauss, stresses the political role of education. In his opinion,
academy and politics are essentially interconnected fields. In ancient China, sages use
the academy to cultivate their virtue in order to govern the country. Academicians
should not refuse to rule. According to Ding, Chinese universities must cultivate
intellectual elites who, on the one hand, know what noble values China should persue,
156 Leo Strauss, “Liberal Education and Responsibility,” LAM, 13-15.
157 Ding Yun (丁耘) is Professor of Philosophy at Fudan University in Shanghai, specializing in Greek
philosophy, German philosophy, with special emphasis on metaphysics and political philosophy.
68
and on the other hand, have the will and wisdom to infuse these values in real politics.158
Ding does not say what the noble values should be, but unlike Strauss, he does not show
his defense of liberal democracy, or of a constitutionalism with Chinese character.
Like Ding, Gan also underlines the political function of liberal education. As has
been shown, Gan asks Chinese universities to cultivate “cultural elites” who will be
confident in the Chinese tradition. The need for cultural elites is a response to a political
fact -- China is rising, so its elites must tell the West how they will influence world
history.159 Then, what is Gan’s answer to this question? He states that, in the political
realm, China should synthesize three traditions, i.e. liberalism (represented by Deng
Xiaoping), socialism (represented by Mao Tse-Tung), and conservatism (represented by
Confucius). But those three isms are not equal but hierarchical: socialism and
conservatism should be higher than liberalism, because socialism will prevent liberalism
from degenerating into capitalist oligarchy, and conservatism will prevent liberalism
from eroding the independence of Chinese civilization. In addition, socialism is even
higher than conservatism. Inheriting an anti-imperialist tradition, Chinese socialism is at
present the best socio-political institution protecting traditional Chinese values.160
Therefore, as Gan places liberalism on the lowest level of the hierarchy, it is very hard
158 Ding Yun, “Zhexue yanjiu yu gujin zhongxi wenti”哲學研究與古今中西問題 (“Philosophical Studies and
the Issue of Ancient, Modern, East and West: My Fudan Experience”), accessed March 19, 2014,
http://www.douban.com/group/topic/23054678/.
159 Xie Maosong, “Cong zhexue dao zhengzhi (2)” (“From Philosophy to Politics (II)”), History of Political
Thought, June 2011, 32.
160 WuMing (吳銘) & Gan Yang, “Gan Yang fangtan”甘陽訪談 (“An Interview with Gan Yang: On China’s
Soft Power”), accessed March 19, 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/20051225/08522225968.shtml.
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for him to support political liberalization in China. Since he cares most about the
independence of Chinese civilization, socialist institutions, rather than liberal democracy,
is already enough for him to achieve this goal. Hence, if liberalism is the least valuable,
and if, as he said, three traditions could be in conflict; then we can definitely conclude
that liberalism in Gan’s theory is the most vulnerable and easily sacrificed value.
Liu’s attitude toward liberal democracy has been shown in his quasi-nationalistic
defense of the traditional Chinese family ethics. His political stance is mainly based on
his view of the relationship between the philosopher and the political society. In his
view, and also Strauss’s, the philosopher will, by his very nature, necessarily be in
tension with every political society, be it Athens or Crete, China or America, because the
philosopher will challenge the laws, conventions and gods in every place.161 There wasn’t,
isn’t, and won’t be any regime on the earth that can protect the philosopher. Therefore,
the central task for the philosopher is to retreat from the political sphere in order to
protect both himself and the multitude. Hence, it can be implied that Liu’s political
stance is very conservative: the philosopher should not always criticize the government,
but should maintain the existing conventions in a given political society.
For this reason, he calls all the politically active intellectuals, whether liberal or non-
liberal, back to their study rooms: “We Chinese intellectuals as the social minority is
facing a fatal and historical choice: either to learn Western Enlightenment and to corrupt
161 Liu Xiaofeng, “Ciwei de wenshun” (“The Moderation of the Hedgehog”), Shitelaosi de lubiao, 44.
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ourselves, or to accept the Socratic-Platonic enlightenment and to cultivate our classical
mentalities.”162 He implies that most Chinese intellectuals have been corrupted.
However, what makes Liu happy is that China is temporarily not as modern as the West.
The West has been modernized and has completed the building of an educational
system aiming at producing the modern soul. Most Chinese intellectuals want to catch
up with the Western world as soon as possible. But fortunately, according Liu, we are
not at the final destination. “It is precisely because our educational system has not been
in line with you [the West] that we must implement classical education as soon as
possible.”163 Hence, “Strauss’s classical political philosophy is more indispensable in
China than in Europe-America.”164
Liu may wish that once public intellectuals retreat from the political sphere and are
baptized by ancient classics, Chinese modernization can be slowed down, leaving
Chinese people an unenlightened but peaceful life admiring their traditional values.
This future image is certainly not a liberal democracy, because the retreat of liberal
intellectuals from politics implies that no one could promote political liberalization in
China. This image may also frustrate the Westerners: “Once China advocates moral-
political ideas which originate from its own old-style tradition, they [the modern
Westerners] must fear and tremble, because they have no ideas about either ancient
Chinese or ancient Western moral-political conceptions.” As this revival of the Chinese
162 Liu Xiaofeng, “Shitelaosi yu zhongguo” (“Strauss and China”), Shitelaosi de lubiao, 348.
163 Ibid, 348.
164 Ibid, 341.
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tradition challenges the corrupt modern Western ideas, the Westerners will necessarily
regard China as a threat to themselves.165
Therefore, unlike Strauss who unhesitatingly supported a decent liberal
constitutionalism, Chinese Straussians unhesitatingly express their negative attitudes
toward liberal democracy. They also pay no attention to Strauss’s idea that liberal
democracy can be justified according to ancient, such as Aristotelian philosophy. On the
contrary, strictly following Strauss’s hermeneutic principle that ancient works should
not be understood by modern criteria, they refuse to interpret Confucianism or Daoism
as potential supporters of liberal democracy.166 As there is no counterpart of Aristotle
who had discussed principles of mixed constitution in ancient China, it is almost
impossible for Chinese Straussians to defend liberal democracy from an ancient
perspective.167 Therefore, Chinese liberals have an instinctive fear of the Straussians’
influence. Zhou Lian, a reasonable Chinese liberal, best expressed this worry: “In
present-day China, unlike in the United States, being a critic of liberalism or democracy,
or both, is not dangerous at all. On the contrary, in so doing the critic gains a reputation
of being more thoughtful and profound than vulgar liberals.”168
165 Ibid, 355-356.
166 Ibid, 351.
167 Ancient Chinese political philosophy did not have the concept of “regime” or “polity,” nor did they have
classifications of regimes. Monarchy was the only regime dominating Chinese history.
168 Zhou Lian, “The Most Fashionable and the Most Relevant: A Review of Contemporary Chinese Political
Philosophy,” Diogenes, 56 (2009), 130.
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6. Inconclusive Conclusion
After examining the theories of Chinese Straussians, we can clearly see that Strauss
triggered a nostalgic mentality among his Chinese disciples. Inspired by his revival of
ancient political philosophy, Liu detects a parallel tension between philosophy and the
political society in Chinese intellectual history, while Gan stands on the side of political
theology and hastily defends the traditional Chinese conventions. But their final aim is
the same: liberating China from the modern Western hegemony, and searching for the
autonomy of Chinese civilization. This philosophical stance even makes them, and many
other Straussians, quasi-nationalists and anti-liberals.
Therefore, Strauss seems to be of great significance in China. Ding Yun even
predicts that, “After Straussian conservatism completes its historical mission, China will
welcome a revival of Confucianism and Chinese political thought once more, putting the
era of following Western academic heroes to an end. Deeper introductions and
translations of the Western academy will be continuing, but Western academy will no
longer be the instructor of Chinese academia. The self-consciousness of Chinese thought
is the final destination, the real terminus, of Chinese intellectual history during the
recent thirty years.”169 Therefore, According to Ding, Strauss is the last “Western
academic hero.” He is a bridge connecting the eras of following Western fashions and
169 Ding Yun, “Qimeng zhutixing yu sanshinian sixiangshi”啓蒙主體性與三十年思想史 (“Enlightenment
Subjectivity and the Intellectual History in Recent Thirty Years: a Survey around the Center of Li Zehou”),
Reading, 11 (2008), 24.
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reviving Chinese traditions.
However, there is a question to which Straussians have not offered an answer.
Many famous modern philosophers, from Machiavelli to Rousseau until Nietzsche and
Heidegger, have called people to return to the antiquity, why does only Strauss trigger
this “ancient-mania” in China? Machiavelli’s and Rousseau’s revival of Roman
republicanism might be less relevant to ancient China, but Heidegger, after reading Tao-
Te Ching, advocated that Westerners should learn from Chinese wisdom. However, the
Heidegger fever in China in the 1980s and 1990s did not lead to a corresponding revival
of the Chinese tradition. A typical Straussian may endorse Strauss’s doctrine that all
preceding philosophers, though claimed to be admirers of the ancients, actually
facilitated the waves of modernity. He/she may also say that only the Straussian
approach is capable of resisting modern nihilism. However, this is only an ex post facto
explanation. If we return to the historical context, a 1980s intellectual, before knowing
Strauss, might also regard Heidegger as the best philosopher capable of resisting
nihilism.
Sociological reasons may help us understand why Strauss is powerful today. In the
1980s, as the trauma of the Maoist era was so intolerable, intellectuals focused on how to
restrict the power of the government, and for this reason they were eager to learn from
modern Western experience. The Tian’anmen incident in 1989 led many intellectuals to
lose confidence in the government. However, in the 1990s and the twenty-first century,
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it was precisely under the rule of the authoritarian Communist Party that China enjoyed
huge success. In this background, an increasing number of intellectuals started to defend
China’s unconventional way of development, to investigate China’s particular character,
and to revive the traditional values. Some liberals even converted to non-liberals,
including Liu and Gan. This might be the sociological explanation of Strauss’s
popularity in China.
Although Chinese Straussians have justifiable motivations to praise ancient wisdom,
they still should be cautious. The Chinese Straussians have drawn a broad black and
white contrast between antiquity and modernity. Strauss is to a large degree responsible
for this picture, but the Straussians still ignore that in some places, Strauss showed a
mixed attitude toward modern things. In “German Nihilism,” Strauss actually defended
the modern civilization exemplified by the Anglo way of life, i.e., a modern life mixed
with the ancient wisdom and a “moderation not to throw out the baby with the bath.”170
Once Chinese Straussians become unqualified adherents of the ancient thought, whether
Platonic or Confucian, they may become inflexible; they may be unable to accept even a
minimum of modern wisdom; they may also ignore Socrates’s humble words that the
philosopher should always be conscious of his/her own ignorance. Ultimately, they may
even forget Strauss’s teaching, that
We cannot reasonably expect that a fresh understanding of classical political
170 Leo Strauss, GN, 372.
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philosophy will supply us with recipes for today’s use. For the relative success of
modern political philosophy has brought into being a kind of society wholly
unknown to the classics, a kind of society to which the classical principles as stated
and elaborated by the classics are not immediately applicable. Only we today can
possibly find a solution to the problems of today.171
This is an authentic representation of Aristotelian practical wisdom, which also
corresponds to the ancient Chinese teaching on temporality: “Resting when it is the time
to rest, and acting when it is the time to act. When one's movements and restings all take
place at the proper time for them, his way (of proceeding) is brilliant and intelligent.”172
171 Leo Strauss, CM, 11.
172 “Gen,” Book of Changes周易·艮卦. Translated by James Legge, accessed March 19, 2013,
http://ctext.org/book-of-changes/gen.
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